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ARTICLES
HEIDI GOROVITZ ROBERTSON*
Legislative Innovation in State Brownfields
Redevelopment Programs
INTRODUCTION
States throughout the country have created legislation and ad-
ministrative programs to encourage the cleanup and redevelop-
ment of urban brownfield' land.' In part, these efforts respond
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, and Associate
Professor of Environmental Studies, Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland
State University. This project was supported by a grant from the Cleveland-Mar-
shall Fund. I thank my research assistants, Heather L. Tonsing and Jennifer Lukas
Jackson for their good work on this project, my J.S.D. committee at Columbia Law
School, Professors Richard Briffault, Frank Grad, and Bradley Karkkainen, for their
extensive and thoughtful comments, and my colleague Karin Mika for her input on
this and earlier drafts. This Article was written in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law, in the School of Law, Colum-
bia University.
1 The term "brownfield" has been used broadly and narrowly. According to the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), brownfields are "aban-
doned, idled, or underused industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination."
USEPA web page (visited 09/26/2000) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/glossary>.
The term "brownfield" typically describes contaminated land that is not so contami-
nated that it is at serious risk of a federal or state enforcement action. Lenders and
developers, however, consider even "mild" contamination too serious a liability
threat; for this reason, among others, brownfields tend to lie fallow rather than be
redeveloped.
The definition of "brownfields" or "brownsites," however, is an area of some de-
bate. This stems in part from an inability to value a contaminated site for which
there is no useful, current market value. Further, given the broad spectrum of local
economies and land use objectives, it is difficult to reach consensus on a definition of
the term. Broad definitions include all contaminated former industrial properties
that are not available for redevelopment. Narrower definitions limit brownfields to
large city properties that are both abandoned and large enough to support signifi-
cant redevelopment. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND BARRIERS
TO BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT (1996). See also ROBERT A. SIMONS, TURNING
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to the federal government's recent focus on the issue.3 However,
leadership in method and approach has come, not from the fed-
eral government, but from the states.4 States have approached
the cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated land in a variety
of ways, some choosing to create voluntary cleanup programs,
others imposing mandatory cleanup programs, and still others us-
BROWNFIELDS INTO GREENBACKS 30 (1998) (using a "broad, urban definition of
brownfields"). In addition, some of the state and local laws designed to encourage
redevelopment of industrial sites are not actually geared to "brownsites" any more
than any other underused or unused former industrial site. See Bernard A. Wein-
traub & Sy Gruza, The Redevelopment of Brownsites, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Spring 1995, at 57.
2 See, e.g., ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-282.05 (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-
7-1101 et seq. (Michie 2000); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 25-16-301 et seq. (2000); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133a et seq. (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9101 et
seq. (2000); FLA. STAT. § 288.107 (2000) and FLA. STAT. § 376.77 et seq. (2000); GA.
CODE ANN. §12-8-200 et seq. (2000); IND. CODE. ANN. § 13-25-5-1 et seq. (West
2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455H.101 et seq. (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-161
et seq. (1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.01-450 to 224.01-465 (Michie 2000); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2285 et seq. (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E
(West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 5 (2000); 1998 MASS. ACTS 206; MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 324.20101 et seq. (2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.01-115B.24 (2000);
1998 Miss. LAWS 528; Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.565 et seq. (2000) and Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 447.700 et seq. (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-730 through 75-10-738 (2000);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-15,181 to 81-15,188 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 459.610
et seq. (Michie 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-F:1 et seq. (2000); 1997 N.J. LAWS
278; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4G-1 et seq. (Michie 2000); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 56-0501 to 56-0511 (McKinney 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.30 et seq.
(2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27A, § 2-
15 (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.325 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-1 et
seq. (2000); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.601 to 361.613 (West 2000);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-8-101 et seq. (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a (2000);
VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.1 to .3 (Michie 2000); W. VA. CODE § 22-22-1 et seq.
(2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 292.15 (West 2000).
3 See William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institu-
tional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 2, 39 (1997) (noting that
federal, state, and local programs exist to encourage brownfields redevelopment,
and that the states have been innovators in this area, whereas the federal govern-
ment is usually the leader in data gathering and investigation into pollution control
strategies).
4 See id. See also U.S. EPA-OSPS Brownfields Homepage (visited 9/26/2000)
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bfl#bfini> (containing information regarding EPA's
Brownfields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund Pilots, National Brownfields Assess-
ment Pilots, among other brownfields programs). Additionally, according to the
website, "on August 5, 1997, President Clinton signed the Taxpayer Relief Act (HR
2014/PL 105-34), which included a new tax incentive to spur the cleanup and rede-
velopment of brownfields in distressed urban and rural areas." The Clinton Admin-
istration also implemented the Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda,
announced in May 1997, which "outlines a comprehensive approach to the assess-
ment, cleanup, and sustainable reuse of brownfields, including specific commitments
from 15 Federal agencies."
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ing combinations of these approaches. Regardless of method,
however, the push to clean brownfield land is grounded in a
widespread desire to return that land to productive use, and also
in the more fundamental desire to repair the environment in
which we live and work.
This Article examines state legislative and administrative ef-
forts to redevelop urban brownfield land by reducing the envi-
ronmental barriers to redevelopment. I have argued in the past
that, despite the best efforts and best intentions of citizens, legis-
lators, and bureaucrats, real success will elude state brownfields
programs, in part, because they tend to ignore the non-environ-
mental factors that present significant barriers to redevelopment,
especially in urban areas.' Here, I argue that some of the legisla-
tive innovations in those same state brownfields programs, al-
though created to facilitate the programs' goals, may be risky or
unwise without some alterations. This Article analyzes two im-
portant innovations in states' efforts to encourage brownfields
redevelopment: the application of cleanup standards determined
by the intended future use of the land, and the use of licensed or
certified environmental professionals to oversee and certify the
cleanup of brownfield sites. These two innovations illustrate in-
stances where legislatures or state administrative agencies at-
tempted to streamline a process to facilitate the program's or
legislation's goal of reducing the environmental barriers to
brownfields redevelopment, thus facilitating cleanup and
redevelopment.
The first innovation, setting cleanup standards according to the
future use of the land, is an innovative approach to making con-
taminated land more attractive to potential redevelopers. The
rationale for this innovation is that reduced cleanup standards
can make the cleanup faster and less costly, thereby moving
brownfield land quickly and cost-effectively into productive use.
I will conclude that although such standards certainly reduce the
cleanup costs associated with choosing and redeveloping a con-
taminated property, the remaining externalities render the inno-
vation risky on several levels.
The second innovation, the use of private professionals to cer-
tify the completion of a cleanup, is an innovative method for cre-
5 See generally Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One Piece of the Puzzle: Why State
Brownfields Programs Can't Lure Businesses to the Urban Cores Without Finding the
Missing Pieces, 51 RurGERS L. REV. 1075 (1999).
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ating efficiencies in the agency oversight process. I will conclude
that this innovation, in some of its existing forms, appears to be
effective and efficient. However, in its most extreme form, this
innovation may amount to an abrogation of government respon-
sibility that could put neighborhoods and people at risk due to
the questionable quality of oversight.
Some states have been particularly innovative in their efforts
to reduce the environmental barriers to redevelopment, thereby
hoping to encourage redevelopment of brownfield land. 6 In par-
ticular, many states have allowed cleanup standards to vary ac-
cording to the intended future use of the land.7 This means that
6 Note that many barriers to the redevelopment of contaminated urban properties
are non-environmental, for example, the size and location of a site, the size and
configuration of the existing building, the available infrastructure, local crime rates,
or access to transportation. See generally Robertson, supra note 5.
7 See, e.g., BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, THE CLEANUP AND REDEVELOP-
MENT OF CONTAMINATED LAND (Michael B. Gerrard, ed. 2000) [hereinafter
BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE], AL.01[5]; ALA. CODE § 22-30A-6;
AZ.01[1][e][ii]; ARIz. ADMIN. CODE R18-7-205; BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE
CA.01[5]; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.1.5(d) (only future use restricted
with proper institutional controls); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, IL.01[2][c]-
[d]; IA.01[5][c]; IOWA CODE ANN. 455H.204(2)(a) to (e); IowA ADMIN. CODE r.
567-137.6(455H); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, MD.01[6] (if limited use to
industrial/commercial, then must record in land records); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND
PRACTICE, MN.01[1][h] and MN.02[6]; see MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY
VOLUNTARY INVESTIGATION AND CLEANUP GUIDANCE DOCUMENT No. 13, PROCE-
DURES FOR ESTABLISHING SOIL CLEANUP LEVELS (rev. Sept. 1994) (intended or
actual use of land taken into consideration when determining cleanup levels to be
achieved); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, MO.01[5][a]; see Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) Between MDNR and EPA (Sept. 5, 1996) (MOA language con-
templates some flexibility depending on future use, but neither the legislation nor
the regulations address the issue); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, NY.01[5];
Technical and Administrative Guidance Memorandum No. HWR-94-1046, (future
use considered if volunteer wants to deviate from usual cleanup standards);
BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, OH.01[2][b]; OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-
08(B)(2)(c) (establishing three categories of future use, including residential, com-
mercial, and industrial); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, OK.01[4][a]; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27A.§ 2-14-304(B) (the Brownfields Act explicitly provides that the
remediation or no action necessary proposal must be based on the potential risk to
human health and safety and to the environment posed by the environmental con-
tamination, taking into account the proposed use of the brownfield as industrial!
commercial, agricultural or residential); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE,
SC.01[5] (less stringent cleanup standards for VCP sites where a non-responsible
party has agreed to undertake the cleanup, as long as the proposed cleanup is suffi-
cient for and consistent with the proposed future use of the site and does not inter-
fere with or preclude additional state-ordered remedial activity by a responsible
party. The South Carolina Dept. of Health and Environmental Control requires
non-responsible party to enter into a restrictive covenant with DHEC, which im-
poses land use restrictions commensurate with the extent of the cleanup);
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cleanup standards applicable to sites slated for industrial use are
less stringent than those which would apply to sites intended for
residential or commercial use. States have also become more
flexible with respect to the cleanup methods or remediation
methods they allow.8
BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, UT.01[5]; UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-8-114(2) (af-
ter considering the proposed future use of the property, UDEQ may approve
cleanup plans that do not require removal of all releases on the property if the re-
sponse action will be completed in a manner that protects human health and the
environment, among other things); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE,
WA.01[4][b].
8 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 455H.205 (West Supp. 1999); GA. COMP. R. &
REGS. r. 391-3-19.07 (1998) generally and GA. CoMP. R. & REGs. r. 391-3-
19.07(10)(a) (1999) (specifically authorizing engineering controls, such as capping,
point of use treatment, and slurry walls, as part of plans to reduce or eliminate the
potential for human exposure to contaminants at a site). Some states allow the use
of deed restrictions on brownfield properties as a way to control the future use of
land, thereby reducing the risk of human exposure to remaining contaminants. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.05 (West 2000). For a thorough analysis of the use of
institutional controls in cleanup programs, see John Pendergrass, Use of Institutional
Controls as Part of a Superfund Remedy: Lessons from Other Programs, 26 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,109 (1996) (discussing the use of institutional controls to ensure the safety
of cleanups under reduced or variable cleanup standards). New York state, in its
Voluntary Cleanup Program, requires the party conducting the cleanup to place ap-
propriate deed restrictions on the property to ensure it is not used for a "higher" use
than that for which it met cleanup standards. See Charles E. Sullivan, NY Dep't of
Envtl. Conservation Voluntary Cleanup Program 2 (undated) (on file with author);
see also Glen M. Vogel, An Examination of Two of New York State's Brownfields
Remediation Initiatives: Title V of the 1996 Bond Act and the Voluntary Remediation
Program, 17 PACE ENVT'L L. REV. 83, 107 (1999). See also BROWNFIELDS LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 7, at DE.01[6][e][iii] (release from liability dependent on
many site-specific factors, including institutional controls (such as deed restrictions);
BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at GA.01[5]; GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 391-3-
19.08(7) (providing for use of restrictive covenants); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 391-3-
19.07 (providing for engineering controls); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at
IA.01[5][e]; IOWA CODE ANN. 455H.201(4) (West 2000); IowA ADMIN. CODE r. 567-
137.9(5) (2000) (providing for institutional or technical controls); BROWNFIELDS
LAW AND PRACTICE, at KS.01[5][a]; KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-71-11(g) (only allow
institutional controls where these controls will protect human health and the envi-
ronment, and restrictive covenants are used, and where they are not a substitute for
evaluating remedial actions which are technically and economically practicable);
BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at KY.01[5]; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-
465(2) (Michie 2000) (indicates that use of institutional controls, specifically deed
binding land use limitations is allowed in accordance with a remediation plan);
BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at LA.01[5][c]--LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:2286(B) (partial remediation allowed only where owner imposes and records
use restrictions on future use of property); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at
MN.01[1][h]; MINN. STAT. § 115B.175 Subd. 2 (2000) (allowing for use of institu-
tional and engineering controls when considering final remedy); BROWNFIELDS LAW
AND PRACTICE, at MS.01[2][b]; Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-35-5(i), 1998 Miss. LAWS 528,
§ 3(i); Regulation Subpart I, § 103 (providing for land use restrictions-deed, use,
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restrictive zoning); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-35-5(g), 1998 Miss. LAWS 528, § 3(g),
Regulation Subpart I, §103 (providing for engineering controls: "physical or hydrau-
lic"); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACICE, at MO.01[5][c][xi] (institutional controls,
restrictive covenants for sites remediated to non-residential standards and includes
an easement for inspection by Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR)
for life of the covenant); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at MT.01[5][b]; MONT.
CODE ANN. § 75-10-701(11) (2001) (providing institutional controls including deed
restrictions, reservations, covenants, etc.); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at
NJ.01[3]; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10B-12(g), 58:10B-13 (West. 2000) (providing for in-
stitutional or engineering controls); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at
NC.01[51[b]; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.32(b) (2000) (remediation standards are
based on use restrictions), and see generally, Land-use Restrictions May Be Imposed
to Reduce Danger to Public Health at Contaminated Sites: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-
279.9 (2000); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at OK.01[2][c]; OKLA. ADMIN.
CODE 252:220-5-3 (2000) (the VCP application must include a remedial options eval-
uation, which discusses risk-based cleanup levels, economic feasibility, technical fea-
sibility, and reliability for all options considered, including a discussion of
institutional control needed for each option to maintain future uses); BROWNFIELDS
LAW AND PRACTICE, at OR.01[5][b][ii]; OR. REV. STAT. 465.315(1)(c) (2000) (pro-
viding that a variety of means may be used for remedial action, including contain-
ment or engineering controls, institutional controls, such as zoning or deed
restrictions limiting the use of the site); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at
PA.01[5]; see PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, No.
2530-FS-DEP 1849, FACT SHEET 7: LAND-RECYCLING PROGRAM, SPECIAL INDUS-
TRIAL AREAS (1995); 25 PA. CODE § 250.503(d) (2000) (providing that the standards
for cleanup of special industrial sites are characteristically more lenient than other
PA voluntary cleanup standards. These cleanups may use treatment, storage, con-
tainment, or control methods, or any combination of these to address site contami-
nation as long as the remediation protects against any immediate, direct or imminent
threats to public health or the environment); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at
TX.01[3]; 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 350 et seq. The Texas Risk Reduction Program
rules include provisions that affect property assessment, notice requirements, rem-
edy standards, and institutional controls and create tiered, unified performance-
based standards for investigation and cleanup of site contamination. In addition,
they incorporate requirements governing appropriate notice to off-site property
owners and options for utilizing institutional controls (deed notices, restrictive cove-
nants, VCP certificates of completion, zoning ordinances, etc.) in lieu of complete
remediation under certain circumstances. A copy of the final TRRP rules can be
obtained from TNRCC's VCP web page at <http://www.tnrcc.state.tx.us/permitting/
remed/vcp>; BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, at VA.01[5][b]; 9 VA. ADMIN.
CODE § 20-160-90(B)(1) & (2) (No restriction on use for sites that have been
remediated to Tier I background levels or if a risk assessment shows the site is ac-
ceptable for future residential use. For sites that do not achieve the unrestricted use
classification, restriction on use such as institutional and engineering controls will be
required. For example, the Department of Environmental Quality might require
that a commercial property never be developed for residential use); BROWNFIELDS
LAW AND PRACTICE, at WV.01[3][g]; W. VA. CODE ST. R. tit. 60-3, Appendices 60-
3D and 60-3E (sample land use covenant forms) (any limitation on the use of a
remediated property that is required to meet applicable standards must be contained
in a land use covenant); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at
WY.01[1]; 1999 WYO. SEss. LAWS No. 67 (Senate File 147). A copy of the bill is
available at <http://legisweb.state.wy.us/99sessin/enroll/senate/seaOO67.htm>. This
law will become effective July 1, 2001 and adopts site-specific corrective action re-
[Vol. 16, 2001]
HeinOnline  -- 16 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 6 2001
Innovation in State Brownfields Redevelopment Programs 7
Although states throughout the country have created
brownfields redevelopment laws and programs,9 Ohio's Volun-
tary Action Program (VAP) is innovative in several important
ways.' 0 This Article therefore uses it as an example to provide
context for a discussion of legislative innovation in state
brownfields laws. First, Ohio's program allows cleanup standards
to vary in stringency according to the intended future use of the
land. a" Second, it requires private environmental professionals,
certified by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Ohio
EPA), to investigate contamination levels and, according to stan-
dards set by Ohio EPA, to certify the cleanup as requiring no
further action."
In considering whether the potential risks presented by these
innovations are too extensive in light of the benefits they offer,
this Article proposes variations on those innovative themes that
might provide some of the benefits with fewer risks. Part I dis-
cusses the effects of tying cleanup standards to the intended fu-
ture use of the land. Part II discusses the various forms of
privatization in brownfields site assessment and oversight. Fi-
nally, Part III briefly discusses other innovations in state
brownfields redevelopment programs.
quirements that may be inconsistent with federal law Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). It expands the use of institutional controls and exempts
from the state's cleanup requirements landowners who did not cause or contribute
to the contamination. This bill is unlikely to become effective because the Governor
is fighting it, although he allowed it to become law by not vetoing it.
9 See generally Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams?: Challenges and Limits of
Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883 (1996). See
also TODD S. DAVIS AND KEVIN D. MARGOLIS, BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (1997); BROWNFIELDS LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 7.
10 The Ohio program has been called a "leader in this field." Anne Slaughter An-
drew, Brownfield Redevelopment: A State-Led Reform of Superfund 10 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 27, 36 (1999).
11 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-08 (2000). In addition to the first two innova-
tions, Ohio's program, like many others throughout the country, permits some con-
troversial remediation methods for meeting its less stringent cleanup standards, such
as those for properties intended for commercial and industrial uses. Such measures
include using fences to keep people away from contaminated areas and deed restric-
tions to control the future use of the property. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-
08(B)(1)(b)(iv) (2000).
12 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-05 (2000).
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I
CLEANUP STANDARDS DETERMINED BY THE
INTENDED FUTURE USE OF THE SITE
One innovative approach in states' brownfields redevelopment
legislation is the linking of site cleanup standards to the intended
future use of the land. Although the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) has been experimenting with con-
sidering land use in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act's (CERCLA) rem-
edy selection process, the states have been the real pioneers in
applying this model.13 In their efforts to remove environmental
barriers to brownfields redevelopment, states have begun depart-
ing from the traditional rigid health-based standards. 14 Several
studies and reports have supported these efforts, finding a gen-
eral belief that cleanup standards should be based on actual
threats to human health and the environment. 15 The goal of pro-
grams with risk-based standards is to assign cleanup standards
that are sufficiently stringent to make properties safe for the
owners' intended future use, but no more so. This is an effort to
make cleanups satisfactory yet cost efficient, thereby encourag-
13 See Memorandum from Elliott P. Laws, Assistant Administrator, Land Use in
the CERCLA Remedy Selection Process, OSWER DIRECTIVE No. 9355.7-04 (May
25, 1995). However, it is questionable to assume that states will be able to execute
this more effectively that the federal government. See Warren L. Ratliff, The De-
Evaluation of Environmental Organization, 17 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 45
(1997). See also Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2386-87 (1996). For example, research
indicates that in environmental law, the devolution of federal powers to the states is
risky to public health and the environment. Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the
Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351 (2000).
14 It is questionable that states will do any better with flexible standards than they
have done with rigid standards.
15 See PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL REPORT OF REUSE OF INDUS-
TRIAL SITES ROUNDTABLES, at 2 [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL
COUNCIL REPORT]. Stakeholders believe it appropriate to develop generic health-
based standards for particular substances to be applied to any site, but this should
not preclude cleanups to site-specific standards based on actual risks determined by
future land use. Id. at 4. See also UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS,
BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT ACTION AGENDA: INITIAL FRAMEWORK (1996).
In its five recommendations to the President and Congress, the U.S. Conference of
Mayors states that "the selection of cleanup standards based on a property's end use
can result in significant savings for the developer and enhance the likelihood that a
facility will be remediated and redeveloped." Therefore, the Mayor's report recom-
mends that the federal government push to expedite brownfields redevelopment by
recommending cleanup standards based on the future end-use of the land. Id.
[Vol. 16, 2001]
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ing businesses and others to clean and redevelop contaminated
properties.1 6
The question of how stringent cleanup standards must be, or
"how clean is clean," has plagued legislators, administrators and
the regulated community at the state and federal levels since the
inception of Superfund-type laws.17 There are several general
notions about what constitutes sufficiently clean. Under the first
notion, a cleanup standard should require a landowner to return
a property to its pre-release, or pristine condition. The second
idea is that cleanup standards should require landowners to clean
all contaminated properties to a residential-use standard so that
current or future owners could use land for any purpose, up to
and including residential use. The third theory is that cleanup
standards should require landowners to clean contaminated
property only to the level necessary for its intended future use,
whether residential, commercial, or industrial. It is this third no-
tion that may be called a risk-based, flexible, variable, or tiered
system.
States offering such systems of standards tend to offer one or
more of the following as options for program participants:
cleanup to background conditions,18 cleanup to generic numeric
standards,19 or cleanup to site-specific, risk-based standards.2" In
16 See GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, OHIO'S VOLUNTARY CLEANUP AND REDEVELOP-
MENT, A REPORT FROM GOVERNOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH (Spring 1998) [herein-
after GOVERNOR'S REPORT], at 1.
17 See Pendergrass, supra note 8, at 10,109. See also Donald A. Brown, EPA's
Resolution of the Conflict Between Cleanup Costs and the Law in Setting Cleanup
Standards under Superfund, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 241 (1990).
18 See Clement Dinsmore, Financial Barriers and Incentives to Brownfields
Cleanup and Reuse 40 (Jan. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
The definition of the term "background" varies among states, but can mean the
natural and/or manmade condition of the site, minus those conditions attributable to
the contamination at issue. Id. Background standards have been defined as pris-
tine, pre-industrial conditions set by the state agency. Joanne R. Denworth, Use
Restricted-Use Standards Sparingly, THE ENVrL. FORUM, May-June 1995 at 28, 30.
19 These are health-based standards established for various toxic and carcinogenic
substances, largely based on EPA standards. See Denworth, supra note 18, at 30.
See also Dinsmore, supra note 18, at 40. Here, the states establish risk assumptions
to which the remediating party can make limited modifications. See Dinsmore,
supra note 18, at 40.
20 These standards are based on the anticipated future use of the site, for example,
limited close exposures for workers at industrial or commercial sites. See Denworth,
supra note 18, at 30. See also Dinsmore, supra note 18, at 40. Here, the volunteer
remediator can choose to engage in a more exhaustive analysis of site conditions
than may be applicable under other systems of standards. See Dinsmore, supra note
18, at 40.
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allowing these options, specifically with respect to this third cate-
gory, states hope to accept reduced cleanup standards, or partial
cleanups, in exchange for efficient redevelopment.
There are several problems with these risk-based approaches,
however. First, a danger in tying cleanup standards to the in-
tended future land use is that the future land use may not be
eternally controllable, thereby placing future land users at risk
from exposure to remaining contamination. If, for example, the
land use of a contaminated industrial site changed to residential
use, without additional cleanup, there would be a threat to public
health.2 Many programs attempt to alleviate or reduce this con-
cern by employing institutional controls, such as restrictions on
land use, to reduce the risks of exposure to remaining
contamination.
There are also several externalized effects that remain when a
cleanup is completed at less than the most stringent standards.
First, in many instances risk-based standards provide a mecha-
nism for allowing groundwater contamination to remain in place.
This is problematic because science does not provide precise
knowledge of groundwater migration. Second, although environ-
mental justice concerns have gained significant exposure in the
past decade, most programs using risk-based standards do not
address those concerns; that is, risk-based standards often ignore
the fact that many poor and minority communities host aban-
doned industrial sites that are being remediated to reduced
cleanup standards under state brownfields programs. As such,
these communities become neighbors to sites cleaned up to lesser
standards, and, due to their proximity to the site, may be at risk
for exposure to remaining contamination. Finally, the fact that
current landowners can use the land now, but place restrictions
on future use effectively shifts much of the true cost of remedia-
tion and the reduced value of the land to future landowners and
even to future neighboring landowners.
A. A Variety of Approaches Using Risk-Based Standards
In Ohio, a landowner who volunteers to participate in the
state's brownfields program can choose to clean up the property
to generic numeric standards, which are health-based standards
determined according to the human health risk of the chemical
21 See PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
[Vol. 16, 2001]
HeinOnline  -- 16 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 10 2001
Innovation in State Brownfields Redevelopment Programs 11
or carcinogen.2 However, in certain circumstances, the property
owner may instead elect to seek a property-specific risk assess-
ment in which the potential risks associated with the intended
future use of the land will help determine the applicable cleanup
standards.23 Although use of a property-specific risk assessment
does not preclude the landowner from applying generic numeric
standards, and does not prevent application of those standards
following the property-specific risk assessment, the option pro-
vides an opportunity for flexibility. In some circumstances, a
property-specific risk assessment will be mandatory, rather than
elective. This is true when, for example, exposure pathways that
would accompany an intended future use present more risk than
that against which the generic numeric standards protect.24
Similarly, in Colorado's program cleanup standards are based
upon actual risk to human health and the. environment according
to a set of established criteria. Prior to setting cleanup standards,
Colorado considers the present and proposed uses of the site, the
ability of contaminants to move in a way that would expose
humans and the environment to unacceptable risk, the potential
risks associated with cleanup options, and the economic and
technical feasibility of cleanup alternatives. 25
The Indiana brownfields law also provides for flexible cleanup
standards, which allow the owner of a contaminated parcel to se-
lect the level of cleanup desired. However, unlike in most other
states with risk-based cleanup standards, in Indiana the choice of
cleanup level directly affects the level of liability protection the
owner will receive from the state: "The more extensive the
cleanup, the more extensive the protection from future liabil-
ity."'26 At its highest level of cleanup, Indiana provides the vol-
untary remediator with protection from future liability to public
and private claimants with respect to the release or threatened
release that was the subject of the approved voluntary remedia-
tion work plan.27 Protection from liability, however, does not ex-
22 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-09(B) (2000). See also Dinsmore, supra
note 18, at 40.
2 3 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-09(B)(1).
24 See OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-09(B)(2).
25 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-305 (West 2000).
26 Georgette C. Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelop-
ment: Using Stakeholder Theory to Craft Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 53
(1995).
27 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-18(a), (b) (West 2001). After the volunteer and the
Department of Environmental Management have signed a voluntary remediation
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tend to a pre-existing condition on the site that the state agency
was not aware of when it issued the certificate of completion.28
Significantly, after the volunteer remediator and the department
have signed a voluntary remediation agreement, no person 29 may
bring an action related to any release that is the subject of the
agreement, including an administrative action, against the volun-
teer remediator.3 °
Similar to other states with flexible cleanup standards, Penn-
sylvania's brownfields law provides for compliance with one or
more cleanup levels which include background standards,31 state-
wide health-based standards,3 2 and/or site-specific standards. 33 If
a volunteer remediator pursues the background standards for all
regulated substances, or statewide health-based standards for
residual exposure factors, the "[s]ites are rewarded with exemp-
tion from deed notice requirements. . . .Consequently, subse-
quent transfer[s] of remediated property [are] not subjected to
the stigma of being a formerly contaminated site."'34
Before 1994, Connecticut required that participants in that
state's cleanup program clean contaminated sites to pristine
levels.35 But in its brownfields redevelopment law Connecticut
adopted a more flexible system. Despite an uneasiness with the
idea, the Connecticut legislature authorized the state Depart-
agreement, no person may bring an action, including an administrative action,
against the volunteer or any other party acting under the agreement on behalf of the
volunteer for any cause of action related to any release or threatened release of any
hazardous substance or petroleum that is the subject of the agreement. IND. CODE
ANN. § 13-25-5-18(e).
28 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-18(c).
29 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-11-2-158(a). "Person," for purposes of environmental
management laws "means an individual, a partnership, a copartnership, a firm, a
company, a corporation, an association, a joint stock company, a trust, an estate, a
municipal corporation, a city, a school city, a town, a school town, a school district, a
school corporation, a county, any consolidated unit of government, political subdivi-
sion, state agency, a contractor, or any other legal entity."
30 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-18(e).
31 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302 (West 2000).
32 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303.
33 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304.
34 R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup Legisla-
tion, 2 ENVTL. L. 101, 104 (1995).
35 See Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to Save Greenfields: Shifting the
Environmental Risks of Acquiring and Reusing Contaminated Land, 27 CONN. L.
REV. 789, 797 (1995).
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ment of Environmental Protection to institute differentiated or
flexible standards based on proposed future uses of a site.36
Massachusetts' brownfields program is similar to Connecti-
cut's, as it applies different cleanup standards to properties ac-
cording to the intended future use of the land, and uses land use
restrictions, called "activity and use limitations" to control future
use.37 Cleanup standards for brownfields in Connecticut, Massa-
chusetts, and Colorado, as in Ohio and many other states, now
vary depending on the landowner's intended future land use-
for residential, commercial or industrial purposes.
An important issue regarding the use of these various risk-
based cleanup standards is whether, when they allow contamina-
tion to remain on-site, these standards can sufficiently protect fu-
36 See id. at 797.
37 For example, the Massachusetts regulations identify sites according to current
use and the intended future use and categorizes them accordingly. MASS. REGS
CODE tit. 310 § 40.0923 (1998) provides:
The documentation of the Risk Characterization shall identify and describe
the Site Activities and Uses associated with the disposal site and the sur-
rounding environment...
(1) The Site Activities and Uses shall include all current and reasonably
foreseeable uses and activities occurring at the disposal site or in the
surrounding environment which could result in exposure to oil and/
or hazardous material by Human or Environmental Receptors. ...
(2) The current Site Activities and Uses associated with the land itself,
with structures in and on the land, and with the groundwater, surface
water, soil, sediment or other medium which could result in exposure
of Human or Environmental Receptors to oil and/or hazardous ma-
terial shall be identified and described. ...
(3) The reasonably foreseeable Site Activities and Uses shall include
any possible activity or use that could occur in the future to the ex-
tent that such activity or use could result in exposures to Human or
Environmental Receptors that are greater than the exposures associ-
ated with current Site Activities and Uses, except that:
(6) Examples of Site Activities and Uses associated with Human Recep-
tors include, without limitation:
(a) the use of a building as an office, store or residence;
(b) the use of water as drinking water, for washing floors or water-
ing lawns;
(c) the cultivation of fruits and vegetables destined for human con-
sumption (e.g., gardening or farming) and the cultivation of orna-
mental plants;
(d) the excavation of soil;
(e) recreational activities, such as playing baseball, swimming, fish-
ing and hiking;
(f) leisure activities, such as picnicking, sunbathing and entertaining.
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ture land users from harm due to exposure to remaining
contaminants. To determine the existence and degree of health
risk related to redevelopment of a property with contamination
retained on site, one must consider several factors concurrently.
The first is whether there is a toxin or hazardous substance (e.g.,
benzene from petroleum, lead, arsenic, PCBs) present in the soil,
air or groundwater at a contaminated site.38 The second is
whether the contamination is present in a form and concentra-
tion that is dangerous to humans (e.g., 5 parts per billion for ben-
zene). 39 The third is whether there is a transmission mechanism,
or pathway, by which the substance can enter the ecosystem or
the human body (e.g., inhalation, dermal exposure, or ingestion
by drinking or through the food chain).4 0 Finally, one must ex-
amine the potential for actual contact between the human and
the hazardous material (e.g., by children, the elderly, construc-
tion workers, or tenants in a building).41 Breaking the connec-
tion between any two of these factors ensures safety at the site
and keeps risks low. For example, an impenetrable cap placed
over residual contamination can perform this function by block-
ing the pathway between the contamination and human contact.
Regulators and scientists often categorize risks for carcino-
genic toxins in terms of the number of cancer deaths in the popu-
lation. For example, a stringent cleanup level (less risk
remaining onsite, but more expensive to clean) would be one
cancer death in a population of one million (10-6).42 A more leni-
ent standard (with more risk remaining on site) would be one
death in 10,000 (10-).
Despite flexibility in applicable standards, states argue that
they have adhered to standards sufficient to protect public
health, particularly from cancer risk.4 3 This is primarily because
38 See AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY, UNDERSTANDING RISK ANALYSIS-A
SHORT GUIDE FOR HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MAKING 7
(1998) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING RISK ANALYSIS].
39 See Junius C. McElveen, Jr., Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Trying
to Understand the Process, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 45, 56 (1991).
40 See UNDERSTANDING RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 38, at 9. See also McElveen,
supra note 39, at 67.
41 See Amy L. Edwards, ASTM Task Group Developing Guide on Institutional
Controls, ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION STRATEGY, Dec. 1997;
UNDERSTANDING RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 38, at 9.
4 2 See UNDERSTANDING RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 38, at 8. See also McElveen,
supra note 39, at 62-67.
43 See Dinsmore, supra note 18, at 40.
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they have put mechanisms in place to prevent human exposure to
contaminants remaining on brownfield sites. The mechanisms
vary, but as a group, are called institutional controls.
B. Protecting People from Remaining Contamination
Through the Use of Institutional Controls4 4
To protect public health by ensuring that future land owners
and land users do not use land cleaned to an industrial standard
for residential use, reduced cleanup standards are usually accom-
panied by restrictions on the future use of the land. State envi-
ronmental agencies attempt to control future land use through
various forms of institutional controls.45 Institutional controls
can reduce the likelihood that contaminated land will be
redeveloped to a higher use, for which risks to human health
through exposure to remaining contamination would be greater
than for the current use. Although institutional controls once
were merely an interim measure used to protect people from ex-
posure until a site cleanup was complete, these controls are now
used to provide long term protection from exposure, when total
site remediation is not contemplated.46
Institutional controls either prohibit certain kinds of site uses,
or at a minimum, notify potential owners or land users of hazard-
ous substances remaining on site and of conditions that are not
protective of all uses.47 An institutional control, for example,
44 See Robert A. Simons and Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Deed Restrictions and
Other Institutional Controls as Tools to Encourage Brownfields Redevelopment, 7
ENavL. L. & PRAC. 31-38 (1999).
45 See Simons and Robertson, supra note 44. See also Pendergrass, supra note 8;
Larry Schnapf, Protecting Health and Safety with Institutional Controls, 14 NAT. RE-
SOURCE & ENv'T 251 (2000).46 See Amy L. Edwards and Karis Lynn North, Institutional Controls Minimize
Risks at Restored Brownfields, LEGAL TIMES, June 16, 1997, at S40.
47 See Laws, supra note 13. See also 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(D).
EPA expects to use institutional controls such as water use and deed re-
strictions to supplement engineering controls as appropriate for short- and
long-term management to prevent or limit exposure to hazardous sub-
stances, pollutants, or contaminants. Institutional controls may be used
during the conduct of the remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS)
and implementation of the remedial action and, where necessary, as a com-
ponent of the completed remedy. The use of institutional controls shall not
substitute for active response measures (e.g., treatment and/or containment
of source material, restoration of ground waters to their beneficial uses) as
the sole remedy unless such active measures are determined not to be prac-
ticable, based on the balancing of trade-offs among alternatives that is con-
ducted during the selection of remedy.
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may include deed restrictions, restrictive covenants, use restric-
tions, water use restrictions, deed notice requirements, zoning,
permitting, access controls, special notice or recording require-
ments, contractual obligations, and financial responsibility re-
quirements.48 These control mechanisms are expected to render
the property safe for its intended use, despite less stringent
cleanup standards.
Institutional controls can, for example, prevent the use of con-
struction methods that could damage a contamination barrier.
They can prohibit the installation of water supply wells, the use
of pile construction, and even the digging of foundations.49 Insti-
tutional controls can require that a permanent cap remain on site
and that the landowner maintain it.5° Restrictions may also limit
the ability of landowners to sell their property. Institutional con-
trols can provide notice of remaining contamination to subse-
quent landowners, possibly increasing the likelihood that risk will
remain low over time, despite the fact that contamination re-
mains on site. The most common restrictions limit the future use
of the land, and state brownfields programs using risk-based
cleanup standards evaluate risk at a site in terms of the intended
use (post-remediation) of the land.
For example, petroleum or lead contamination remaining
under a shopping center's landscaped area would render that
site, although suitable for its current commercial use, inappropri-
ate for residential use.5 ' A parking lot that is serving as a cap or
barrier against human exposure to remaining underground con-
tamination would be inappropriate for use as a residential site
without further cleanup."2 The developer can realize substantial
cost savings by keeping the contamination on site and limiting
potential human exposure to it through institutional or engineer-
ing controls. Because residual contamination may exceed safe
levels for children playing in the dirt, a brownfields program
would likely require some form of institutional control to prevent
the property from being used for residential purposes in the fu-
ture without further remediation.
48 Id. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18 § 78.995(59) (1997).
49 See Institutional Controls, 24.02[2][a] in BROWNEIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 7.
50 Id.
51 See John Pendergrass, Sustainable Redevelopment of Brownfields: Using Insti-
tutional Controls to Protect Public Health, 29 ENVTL. L. REP,. 10,243 (1999).
52 See id at 10,243.
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Less stringent cleanup standards cost less but imply important
trade-offs. Primary among those trade-offs is the genuine con-
cern regarding whether deed restrictions will suffice in the long
term to protect future land users from the contamination remain-
ing at the site. 3
This question, whether institutional controls can provide suffi-
cient protection for humans from remaining contamination, de-
pends very much on the mechanism by which the control is
imposed. Institutional and engineering controls generally fall
into two broad categories, first, those that derive from property
law, and second, those that derive from governmental author-
ity.54 The controls that lie in common law property law, some-
times called proprietary controls, are essentially contractual
arrangements in deeds or other instruments of property trans-
fer. 5 Restrictions can generally be placed on the property only
in conjunction with a conveyance. Therefore, it is difficult to cre-
ate a restriction, at least of the proprietary form, when a cleanup
has occurred outside the context of a real estate transfer.56 These
forms of restriction also must satisfy certain formalities to be
effective.57
The types of restrictions that a landowner may create in con-
nection with a transfer of an interest in land include restrictive
covenants, easements, reversionary interests, and equitable servi-
tudes. 8 Deed restrictions, although not a term used in tradi-
tional property law, are any of the above described mechanisms
by which a landowner promises either to use, or not to use the
53 One danger left by deed restrictions and other institutional controls is the re-
duction in the value of the property with limited future use. And the more protec-
tive the measure, the more expensive, in terms of the reduction of the future value
of the land, the restriction becomes. Further, the valuable possibility of using re-
stricted land for "higher" land uses creates a temptation to manipulate the adminis-
trative record.
54 See Schnapf, supra note 45. See also Pendergrass, supra note 51.
55 See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 252.
56 See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 252.
57 See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 252. "There must be a written instrument that
satisfies the applicable statute of frauds, the parties must intend that the deed re-
striction attach to the land, it must 'touch and concern' the land, and there must be
'privity of estate."' Schnapf, supra note 45, at 252. This means, as with the other
proprietary forms of control, that deed restrictions must usually be created in con-
nection with a transfer of land. For the restriction to remain attached to the prop-
erty for multiple transfers, the restriction must continue to be recorded with the
deed.
58 See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 252.
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land in a certain way or for certain purposes.5 9 Restrictive cove-
nants, for example, are promises by landowners either to do or
not to do certain things with their land.' These are usually used
in cases with multiple landowners, such that the restrictions can
be enforced by and against one another.6' They can be used, for
example, to prevent landowners from using the groundwater be-
neath a property, drilling wells, or digging ditches. They can also
be used to require landowners to maintain a fence that protects
humans from exposure to on-site contamination.
Covenants that run with the land are enforceable against sub-
sequent owners of the same land, provided the person seeking to
enforce the restriction is entitled to the benefit of the restric-
tion.62 Equitable servitudes are similar to restrictive covenants,
but are enforceable in equity rather than law.63 This means that
rather than collecting damages for a violation of a restriction, the
enforcer can force compliance. An obvious problem with using
servitudes to restrict land use is that they are meaningless if the
party with the right of enforcement declines or neglects to en-
force them. For example, a neighboring property owner may
have the right to enforce a land use restriction contained in a
covenant, but may choose not to do so, instead supporting a lu-
crative development. Also, if the owner of the restricted parcel
were to purchase the properties of those entitled to enforce the
restrictions, there would no longer be anyone left to enforce it.
For these reasons, it would make some sense for enforcement
authority to be held by a state agency, but in the absence of legis-
lative action to the contrary, that is not the nature of common
law-based controls. Like other proprietary controls, covenants
and servitudes must satisfy certain formalities of creation.64
Restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes can be termi-
nated in several ways.65 This may be necessary when, for exam-
ple, a future landowner has remediated a restricted piece of
59 See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 252.
60 See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, ET. AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.13 (2nd ed.
1993).
61 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,248.
62 See Cunningham, supra note 60, at 468.
63 See Cunningham, supra note 60, at 469.
64 See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 252. These must be created in writing, be in-
tended to restrict the uses of the land rather than restricting a person from taking a
particular action, and the new owner must take the land with actual or constructive
notice of the restriction. See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 252.
65 See Cunningham, supra note 60, at 481.
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former brownfield land such that a restriction on future land use
no longer makes sense. In this situation, the court would find that
conditions have changed so much since the creation of the agree-
ment that the purpose for it no longer exists. Covenants and ser-
vitudes may terminate on their own terms, if, for example, they
were written only to apply for a certain number of years or in
certain circumstances. A court may terminate them upon a find-
ing of acquiescence, that is, that the party entitled to enforce the
agreement has failed to enforce it, or agreements like it, against
other parties.66 Courts also will terminate these agreements, on
rare occasion, upon a finding of relative hardship, when the harm
that would be caused to the defendant by enforcement outweighs
the benefit enforcement would provide to the plaintiff.67
Reversionary interests are another form of property law-based
control that one landowner may impose on those holding other
interests in the same land. For example, if a landowner conveys a
piece of contaminated property, but retains a right of re-entry, or
some other reversionary interest, the landowner might exercise
that right and retake the property if the holder of the possessory
interest violates restrictions or conditions contained in the con-
veyance.68 Thus, if the landowner transferred the present posses-
sory interest in the land with a condition that the land be used for
industrial purposes only, and retains a reversionary interest in
the land, that landowner can enforce the condition. However,
several problems exist with this form of control. First, it leaves
the original landowner, and possibly that landowner's heirs, re-
sponsible for enforcing the condition when that may not be a role
those parties are willing to play. Second, the remedy for failure
to abide by the applicable condition is for the estate to revert to
the holder of the reversionary interest.6 9 This party, who may
well be the heir to the original landowner, may want nothing to
do with the contaminated property. The new holder of the rever-
sionary interest may not be interested in the problem of remain-
ing contamination. Again, enforcement authority would more
usefully be held by a state agency.
6 6 JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW, RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 512 (2d
ed. 1997).67 1d. See also Mary R. English and Robert B. Inerfeld, Institutional Controls for
Contaminated Sites: Help or Hazard?, 10 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 121, 126
(1999).
68 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,248.
69 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,248.
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An easement is a right to use land that belongs to someone
else. 70 Easements can be attached to, and run with the land
(easement appurtenant), or be attached to a person, corporation
or government entity (easement in gross).71 Although either
type of easement might be effective as an institutional control for
a brownfield, it is more likely for such easements to be "in
gross."' 72 An easement, for example, could grant a right of access
to land, for inspection purposes, to a government entity. The
easement holder has a right to bring an enforcement action to
force the landowners to allow the easement holder to take the
action allowed through the easement-usually entry under a
right of way.73 As with some other proprietary controls, this
places great responsibility on the easement holder, either a per-
son or an institution, to exercise its rights under the easement to
protect people from contamination.
Some state brownfields laws have easements, created by stat-
ute, which allow the state environmental agency to enter and in-
spect the property to enforce the terms upon which a Covenant
Not to Sue, or No Further Action letter was issued.74 Other
states require the landowner to transfer an easement to the state
agency, for the purposes of inspection and enforcement, during
the course of settlement negotiations. It is early to predict how
well state agencies will do with the authority their states have
given them to enforce these statutory modifications on common
law land use restrictions. However, the idea of enforcing land
use restrictions is new to state environmental agencies, and the
restrictions become weak if the agencies neglect or choose not to
engage in this traditionally private matter. As a practical matter,
environmental agencies do not generally have mechanisms in
place to enforce land use restrictions. And, if and when they do
have mechanisms in place, they may not choose to make the im-
plementation of those mechanisms a priority.
Because these property law based restrictions are generally de-
pendant on a real estate transfer,75 some states have statutorily
created systems whereby, in the absence of a transfer, the pro-
70 See Cunningham, supra note 60, at 436-37.
71 See Cunningham, supra note 60, at 441.
72 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,250-51.
73 See Cunningham, supra note 60, at 436-41. See also Schnapf supra note 45, at
252.
74 See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 253.
75 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,249.
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gram participant would unilaterally record the required restric-
tion with the deed.76 In fact, some states use restrictions that are
similar to the property law based forms of land use control, but
that are based in statute rather than common law. For example,
in addition to its "activity and use limitations," Massachusetts has
created statutory easements that are exempt from the common
law limitations that would limit the effectiveness of their com-
mon law counterparts.77 In Arizona, when a soil cleanup does
not satisfy a residential use standard, the statute requires that an
''environmental mitigation use restriction" be recorded in the
property records.78 Michigan, Ohio, and California have statuto-
rily created various forms of restrictive covenants that run with
the land.79
Connecticut, which has created "environmental land use re-
strictions" that run with the land, has also provided a statutory
back-up plan.8" If a court finds that the statutory restrictions are
unenforceable, the statute provides that the landowner must
abate the remaining pollution to standards acceptable for resi-
dential or recreational uses.81 In New Hampshire, remediated
brownfield sites must maintain a record of any use restriction
placed on the property, those use restrictions must run with the
land, and if they are violated, the site's release from liability to
the state is voidable.82 Further, New Hampshire has made some
statutory changes in brownfield restrictions that remove some
common law limitations. Specifically, New Hampshire has legis-
lated that the traditional property law rule against perpetuities
and rules against unreasonable restraints on alienation do not ap-
ply to these restrictions.83 Without these statutory modifications,
the common law property rules would make it difficult, if not
impossible, to enforce some restrictions over the long term. Be-
76 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,249.
77 See English and Inerfeld, supra note 67, at 131.
78 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,249, citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-152B
(1997).
79 See English and Inerfeld, supra note 67, at 131 (citing Susan C. Borinsky, The
Use of Institutional Controls in Superfund and Similar State Laws, 7 FORDHAM
ENVW'L L.J. 1 (1995)).
80 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,249, citing CorN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133a-
133k(a)(3) (1995).
81 See English and Inerfeld, supra note 67, at 131.
82 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,250, citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-
B-F:6 (1996).
83 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,250, citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-
B-F:6 VI(b)(c) (1996).
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cause these programs and tools are all quite young, it is too soon
to know whether they will be effective in the long term. 4 Also,
one potential problem they raise is that, despite the benefits dis-
cussed above of enforcement authority lying with state agencies,
that authority carries with it an administrative burden. Agencies
may well not have the administrative capacity to carry out these
tasks. We know that zoning and planning boards tend not to do
title searches prior to approving building permits and zoning
changes.85 They leave private matters to private property own-
ers. Although these statutorily created restrictions make land
use restrictions a public matter, it is not clear that agencies are
prepared to manage them.
States often require one or more of these land use restrictions
when a state environmental agency gives a brownfield project a
letter of completion or covenant not to sue, despite the fact that
contamination remains on site. For example, Ohio requires that
No Further Action letters and Covenants Not to Sue be recorded
with the deed to the property.86 New Hampshire has a similar
provision that requires the recording of "use restrictions" where
cleanup decisions were based on assumptions regarding the fu-
ture use of the land.8 The restriction must be filed with the ap-
plicable deed recording office, usually the miscellaneous liens
section of the county recording office, and becomes part of the
property's permanent title record.88 Landowners, present or fu-
ture, can have the restriction removed only upon remediation of
the site in accordance with applicable cleanup standards. Land
use restrictions may be removed when the applicable environ-
mental agency that originally required them files a waiver of the
restriction with the county recording office.8 9
841 have made several attempts to determine what state agencies know about the
longer term effectiveness of their institutional controls. However, as far as I can tell,
no agency has enough information to take a position on this.
85 For example, a 1998 Report of the. International City/County Management As-
sociation indicated that seventy-two percent of local governmental bodies surveyed
did no search titles before making zoning changes. See CHRISTINE GASPAR AND
DENISE VAN BURIK, LOCAL GOVERNMENT USE OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS AT
CONTAMINATION SITES 15 (1998).
8 6 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.14 (West 2000).
8 7 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-F:13V, F:15 (2000).
88 Id.
89 In New York, once a deed restriction is properly in place on the deed, it cannot
be removed without first notifying the Department of Environmental Conservation.
This same principle applies in other instances where the deed restriction was im-
posed as part of a remediation plan, or in exchange for a liability release from the
[Vol. 16, 2001]
HeinOnline  -- 16 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 22 2001
Innovation in State Brownfields Redevelopment Programs 23
Institutional controls more clearly derived from governmental
authority include those "exercised through planning and zoning
processes and ordinances, subdivision plats, building permits, sit-
ing restrictions and groundwater use restrictions," such as well-
drilling prohibitions or well use permits. 9 States have broad au-
thority, through their police power, to regulate the behavior of
private citizens for the protection of public health, safety, and
welfare.91 States grant municipalities the power to enact and en-
force zoning regulations. Through their zoning and planning
processes, localities can exercise significant control over land use.
However, this is very much a political process, and can be
changed by future groups of local politicians.92
Zoning has some potential to be effective as an institutional
control in brownfields redevelopment. 93 There are four primary
reasons for this. First, because zoning decisions are local, and
therefore closest to the brownfield site, the local governmental
body can monitor the use of the land. Second, zoning and insti-
tutional controls share a common purpose, to promote and pro-
tect public health and welfare-although both have significant
economic components as well. Third, because zoning is a highly
public process, it can increase awareness of the land use and con-
tamination issues, both regarding a particular site and in general,
and increase public acceptance of land use controls. Fourth, zon-
ing systems already exist and need no separate statutory or regu-
latory authority to function as an institutional control. Finally,
zoning is flexible, and can be made site-specific through vari-
ances, and conditional and special use permits.94
Zoning is not a perfect tool, however. Because zoning boards
are political, and heavily influenced by the extent of public con-
cern with respect to a change, they could easily vote to eliminate
restrictions when their constituencies have forgotten the underly-
ing purpose or importance of the original zoning decision that
restricted the land use. This could happen when a developer
state. Deed restrictions might also be removed, like covenants and other property
law based land use controls, when they are obsolete or abandoned, etc. See Cun-
ningham, supra note 60, at 463.
90 Schnapf, supra note 45, at 253.
91 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,245.
92 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,245.
93 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,246-48.
94 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,246-47.
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wants to put houses near a former brownfield that now looks, but
is not, perfectly green and safe.95
Also within the category of governmental authority based con-
trols are informational devices (notice, registry, transfer act re-
quirements, and public outreach), consent orders and permits,
access controls, and monitoring requirements.96 One form of
control in the broader category of informational devices, deed
notice requirements, can help future landowners by providing
them with information regarding the character and location of
remaining contamination. Like a deed restriction, some deed no-
tice requirements will attach this notification to the deed such
that it runs with the land, thereby notifying subsequent landown-
ers that the property is contaminated in some specific way. In
such systems, the deed notification remains in place until further
cleanup makes it unnecessary. 97 A deed notification often will
provide a brief summary of the site's history, explain the nature
and circumstances of the contamination, present warnings with
respect to land or water use, and refer to documents that will
contain more specific information.9" A deed notice requirement
may require actual notice or disclosure to a future purchaser of a
property, rather than merely recording the notice with the deed
to the land.99 However, with some deed notice requirements, the
notice appears with the deed, thereby constructively notifying
the next purchaser of the property, but it does not continue onto
the next deed unless the new owner takes some specific action.
In this situation, subsequent owners would not be notified unless
their title searches went back more than one transfer, which is
unusual.
Other mechanisms for providing notice to subsequent land-
owners include requiring the publication of legal notices in news-
papers or the posting of signs on the property. As with deed
notice requirements, except for posted signs, these notices would
not be likely to reach tenants, who typically do not perform title
or other searches prior to signing a lease. To combat this prob-
lem, some communities have created Geographical Information
95 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,247.
96 See Amy L. Edwards, Types of Institutional Controls, ENVIRONMENTAL COM-
PLIANCE AND LITIGATION STRATEGY, Dec. 1997.
97 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,251-52.
98 See Institutional Controls, 24.02[2][a] in BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE
supra note 7.
99 See Pendergrass, supra note 51, at 10,253-54.
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System registries of contaminated sites and posted them on the
web. Through these web sites, interested tenants or neighbors
can find some information about the environmental status of a
particular site.1"'
Unlike zoning regulations, which may be subject to the whims
of local governmental bodies, other forms of restrictions run with
the land from the current property owner to subsequent owners.
Unlike permits, which may contain conditions or restrictions per-
taining to land use, deed restrictions attach to the land, rather
than the permit holder. Permits bind the current property
owner, or permit holder, but new landowners would need their
own permits, and are not bound by those of their predecessors.
Therefore, in theory, deed restrictions are readily available
through a standard title search, and should provide adequate
protection against harm for future site users.
In addition, engineering controls, such as parking lots or clay
barriers, fences, encapsulation, or membranes beneath landscap-
ing can help programs with tiered cleanup standards control risk.
The manner and extent to which these are imposed and enforced
depends on applicable state law.
Some states maintain a registry, usually linked to or derived
from the requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act, of a list of sites that have been used
in the past for hazardous substance disposal. 10 1 In the future, lo-
cal registries may maintain a list of sites within their jurisdictions
that are restricted in terms of use or transfer. Potential purchas-
ers of land could consult the registry to determine the status of a
candidate site. A site's listing in this type of registry could be-
100 See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 253.
101 See Judith G. Tracy, Beyond Caveat Emptor: Disclosures to Buyers of Con-
taminated Land, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 169, 206 (1991) (citing Iowa Code Ann.
§ 455B.426 (West 1990) (registry of abandoned or uncontrolled sites)); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 260.440 (West 1990) (registry of abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-212(d) (1987 & Supp. 1990) (notice on deed
that cleanup or containment occurred on property); W. VA. CODE § 20-5E-20 (1989)
(disclosure in deed that property was used for storage, treatment, or disposal of
hazardous waste); Wisc. STAT. ANN. 144.442(4)(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990) (in-
ventory of sites that may cause environmental pollution). For example, the Massa-
chusetts' Department of Environmental Protection "maintains online databases that
identify superfund sites (the NPL or National Priorities list), potential Superfund
Sites (CERCLIS), and four RCRA databases," through its Waste Management
Branch. See BARBARA A. LAAKSO AND RICHARD J. GALLOGLY, LAND USE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, MASSACHUSETTS PARALEGAL PRACTICE MANUAL (1997).
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come a part of the site's chain of title, thus providing an addi-
tional avenue for notice to a prospective purchaser of the site.
Some states place special requirements on the transfer of con-
taminated properties. Specifically, a purchaser can void a trans-
action if the seller failed to disclose or convey certain
information regarding the environmental status of the site. For
example, a property is subject to the Connecticut Transfer of
Hazardous Waste Establishment Act102 if, after 1980, it gener-
ated more than 100 kilograms of hazardous waste in any single
month, if at any time it was the site of recycling, storing, han-
dling, disposal or storage of hazardous waste, or if a dry cleaner,
furniture stripper, or automobile repair/paint shop was located
there after 1967.103 To transfer any property that fits these char-
acteristics, both the owner and purchaser must execute a specific
form provided by the state Department of Environmental Pro-
tection's Property Transfer Program. 10 4 The program has several
versions of this form, and which form applies varies according to
the environmental condition of the property. °5 The forms range
from a simple declaration by the transferor that no hazardous
waste has spilled on the premises to written notification that the
site has been remediated to applicable standards and will be ap-
propriately monitored. 10 6
State environmental agencies can often ensure that deed re-
strictions and other institutional controls are recorded with the
applicable deed. To start, the agency can create a liability release
that remains ineffective until the applicable deed restriction is
properly recorded or executed. Theoretically, these recorded re-
strictions should need little additional enforcement as few lend-
ers or purchasers would lend or spend money for a restricted
property. At a minimum, the issuing agency could revoke a Cov-
enant Not to Sue, or other liability release, for failure to abide by
restrictions or other controls. 107 In Ohio, for example, the state
EPA issues a Covenant Not to Sue to a property owner after a
certified environmental professional issues a No Further Action
letter, indicating that the site has met applicable standards. 10 8
102 1998 Conn. Pub. Acts 253.
103 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(3) (1998).
104 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(a).
105 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(10).
106 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(12-13).
107 See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 253.
108 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-13 (2000).
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That Covenant Not to Sue releases the volunteer remediator
from liability to the state agency for environmental issues dealt
with in the cleanup process and may be transferred to subsequent
owners of the property. 10 9
For other institutional controls, such as signage indicating an
existing hazard, or fence or cap requirements, enforcement
mechanisms are less clear. It is uncertain whether state agencies
or local authorities would enforce them. Even once that jurisdic-
tional issue is resolved, it is unclear what kind of priority the ap-
plicable authority would give to the enforcement of such
controls.
Some federal and state regulators are concerned that deed re-
strictions lose strength as they grow in age. 110 One reason is that
state and local regulators may not have the resources, over time,
to enforce restrictions that may not, in the future, seem as impor-
tant as they did at their inception. This may be especially true for
a site with residual contamination that becomes, many years
later, covered with grass and trees.
Because present or future landowners may fail to comply with
a deed restriction, the restriction itself does not prevent exposure
to remaining toxins. Although the noncomplying landowner may
subject himself or herself to the health and liability risks associ-
109 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-13(K) (2000).
110 If the goal of institutional controls is to protect humans who may, in the future,
be exposed to remaining contamination, one wants the restrictions to be long-last-
ing. However, the length of their life raises other issues. For example, property law
has long been concerned about the power of one generation to control the owner-
ship and use of land by future generations. There are basic policies of property law
against unreasonable restraints on alienability, that is, unreasonable restrictions on
one's ability to transfer ownership of their land, especially when those restrictions
come from past generations. In fact, the famous Rule Against Perpetuities prevents
a grantor of property from creating an interest in land that might vest too far in the
future. One reason for this is that it gives that ancient landowner too much power
over those who come after him. Some might raise the same concerns about deed
restrictions that last eternally. Although they protect future land users from remain-
ing contamination, they may severely restrict what future landowners and users may
do with their land. There are a couple of ways to handle this. First, one might create
deed restrictions of limited duration. Of course, the problem would be that the du-
ration must be sufficient to protect against the remaining risk. If the risk is such that
it dissipates over time, the restrictions should not last beyond that time. Second, one
might, as in many jurisdictions, make clear a mechanism by which restriction can be
removed by cleaning the land to more stringent standards, or testing the land to
ensure that the risk has been sufficiently reduced. Third, one might decide that it is
enough to provide information to future landowners regarding the environmental
status of the site, and let them decide at what level they are willing to bear the risk.
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ated with noncompliance, that noncompliance also places others
at risk. The failure of a landowner to comply with a deed restric-
tion could lead to release of remaining toxins and contact of
those toxins with humans. Therefore, although deed restrictions
are permanent by nature, they may appear temporary because
they are only as permanent as compliance with them provides.
If a future landowner violates the restriction by using or al-
lowing use of the land in a manner unintended by the volunteer
remediator, that landowner places those who interact with the
land at some increased degree of health risk, depending on the
environmental status of the site. In addition, the violator may
incur legal liability to individuals harmed by exposure to the site,
and to the agency.111 If an owner fails to abide by deed restric-
tions or engineering controls required by the applicable Cove-
nant Not to Sue or No Further Action letter, that landowner
would lose the liability protections the document provided.' 12
Also, local planning commissions do not typically evaluate
every deed in an area before altering the zoning for that area.113
They therefore might inadvertently rezone restricted property
from industrial to residential use. Although the deed restriction
technically would still apply, the property could easily "slip
through the cracks," thereby subjecting people to increased risk.
Likewise, local authorities that grant building permits do not al-
ways examine deeds, and thus could accidentally grant permits
that would lead to a land use or construction process that could
disturb contaminated soil and increase the possibility of human
exposure to a previously controlled risk.1 14
Therefore, although there are many important issues concern-
ing the use of deed restrictions and other institutional controls,
the most important is that of institutional memory. Institutional
controls should theoretically provide eternal control over the use
of the land. Given that many county record departments are
computerized, and that most others are heading in that direction,
once the deed restriction is filed institutional memory should be
quite permanent. However, there are no data to support this as-
sertion, and there remains a risk that the deed restriction, al-
l" OHIO REV. CODE AN. § 3746.22 (2000).
112 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(B)(2)-(4).
113 See Gaspar and Van Burik, supra note 85.
114 See Susan C. Borinsky, The Use of Institutional Controls in Superfund and
Similar State Laws, 7 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. J. 1, 6 (1995).
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though permanent in nature, may fail to protect against human
exposure to remaining toxins due to lack of compliance or en-
forcement. Therefore, independent monitoring or verification in
the form of a local registry should be in place.
The option of using land use restrictions and other institutional
controls in support of state brownfields redevelopment efforts is
critical to the success of these programs. Without institutional
controls, we cannot ensure sufficient protection of human health
and the environment under circumstances where contamination
will remain onsite. Developers often will not assume the high
cost of permanent site remediation, opting instead for risk based
corrective action. Even with the available tiered cleanup stan-
dards, without deed restrictions and other institutional controls
landowners and potential developers would not assume the lia-
bility risk associated with brownfield properties without signifi-
cant assurances regarding the long-term safety of the site.
Unlike permanent cleanup of a site, no deed restriction can
eliminate risk entirely. However, deed restrictions can signifi-
cantly reduce risks of human exposure to remaining toxins. They
can lower risk for certain land uses, such that land is well-used
and human beings protected against exposure. They can allow
such land use because they make it possible for developers and
landowners to cleanup land economically, while providing some
protection from risk and liability. In other words, in conjunction
with engineering and other site controls, land use restrictions as-
sist state brownfields programs in encouraging economically fea-
sible urban redevelopment without substantially increasing
health risks.
To ensure that land use restrictions and other institutional con-
trols can accomplish the lofty goal of allowing economical
cleanup, efficient land use, and protection against human expo-
sure, these restrictions must be enforced. Mechanisms must be
developed to ensure that landowners comply with these restric-
tions and that applicable government agencies enforce them.
Whether these restrictions and controls can meet these important
challenges remains an open question, but their promise helps jus-
tify the innovative approach within state brownfields programs of
setting cleanup standards according to the intended future use of
the land.
HeinOnline  -- 16 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 29 2001
30 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION
C. Some Externalized Environmental Effects of Risk-Based
Cleanup Standards
1. Future Generations of Landowners
Externalized environmental effects remain when a piece of
land is cleaned up to less than pristine standards. Some of the
burdens of those externalized effects are borne by future genera-
tions of landowners. When a current landowner applies the less
stringent levels of risk-based standards, as discussed above, there
is always some remaining environmental risk to future owners
and users of land. As discussed, this risk is reduced, if not elimi-
nated, through deed restrictions and other institutional controls.
In addition to issues of residual environmental risk, future
landowners will suffer from other externalized effects, such as
the reduced economic value of the land due to the current land-
owner's failure to complete a full cleanup. If the increase in cur-
rent value suits the current landowner's needs, he or she may
choose to complete a partial cleanup and accept some of the land
use restrictions that go with it. Accepting this reduced economic
value may be a calculated decision by current landowners. That
is, they know what the land is worth in its contaminated state,
and they have determined or predicted the value of the land in its
partially remediated state. The landowner gets something more
than he had, but something less, in terms of full value, than he
might have.
Because the current landowner has less, the future landowner
gets less upon transfer. That said, the future landowner may well
have paid a reduced price for the now less valuable land. The
partially-remediated land is less valuable for several reasons.
First, it is less valuable by virtue of its environmentally impaired
state. Second, it may be less valuable due to the very restrictions
placed on its uses for purposes of protecting human beings from
exposure to remaining contamination. The reduced ability to use
the land renders it less valuable. Third, the stigma attached to
restricted, contaminated, or once restricted or contaminated
land, may also reduce its value.
The environmentally impaired state of the property, impaired
due to the partial nature of a risk-based cleanup, also contributes
to the reduction in property value for future generations of land-
owners. Environmentally impaired properties are of reduced
value to future generations of landowners due, at least in part, to
[Vol. 16, 20011
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the high cleanup costs and immeasurable liability associated with
environmental contamination. It is these very issues that make
contaminated properties undesirable in the first place, and which
lead to the creation of brownfields programs to encourage their
cleanup and redevelopment.
Future generations of landowners bear externalized costs due
to the very land use restrictions placed on the property to protect
the same future landowners. For partial cleanups to be viable in
terms of the safety of future persons who come into contact with
the land, there must be reliable restrictions on use, or other
methods of breaking pathways of human exposure to the remain-
ing contamination. Although there are many ways to achieve
this, more fully dealt with above, any such methods will reduce
the value of the property, at least as compared with the value to
future generations of landowners that the property would hold if
it had been fully remediated.
Even after a site is partially remediated, it suffers some loss in
value due to the stigma attached to its being a formerly, or par-
tially contaminated site. Even if the new owner is operating with
full knowledge of the environmental facts surrounding a site, the
value of that site is harmed by its past. Based on knowledge of
the amount of economic harm the stigma imposes on the site, a
potential future landowner can make an informed decision with
respect to the investment. However, other people who may in-
teract with the site, perhaps people who are less informed about
the true environmental status of the site, may believe the site to
be more contaminated and dangerous than it is. People fear
health harms at such sites, as well as liability of harm to others.
In addition to fear by individuals, banks and insurance compa-
nies also fear partially-remediated sites, which adds to the exter-
nalized costs borne by future generations of landowners.
In addition, future generations of neighboring landowners will
be adversely affected by the partial remediation next door. The
value of their property might suffer for any of the reasons dis-
cussed above, but in all likelihood, they got none of the benefit.
Finally, society at large will suffer because the partially
remediated site is now usable for a reduced range of uses. By
choosing partial remediation, the current landowner has ex-
tended his or her control of land uses and land values, not only to
future owners of his -or her parcel, but to future owners of other
parcels, and to society at large.
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2. Groundwater Contamination
When state brownfields programs relax cleanup standards to a
risk-based level appropriate to the intended future use of the
land, the standard often does not take into account the remaining
contamination of groundwater reservoirs, called aquifers. If con-
taminated groundwater, at the site location or elsewhere, be-
comes a source of drinking water, the population using that
water supply may be exposed to dangerous contamination. Over
half of the United States' population depends on groundwater
aquifers for its drinking water.11 5 Also, some groundwater re-
joins rivers and lakes, which are also significant sources of drink-
ing water and food supply.116 For example, although placing an
impermeable cap over contaminated soil will prevent the upward
migration of toxic substances, thereby protecting future land
users by limiting their possibility of exposure, a cap will not pre-
vent contamination from seeping downward into groundwater.
The standard also may not prevent the underwater migration of
toxic substances to neighboring parcels of land, or to connected
aquifers.
Groundwater is a particularly difficult problem. One reason
for this is that contaminated plumes might move only short dis-
tances, or they might move long distances in a single day, de-
pending on hydrological conditions. The difficulty lies in the fact
that the direction and rate of flow of groundwater is difficult and
costly to predict with any degree of accuracy. These factors, di-
rection and rate of flow, vary significantly due to changes in
groundwater use patterns, such as those for drinking water, irri-
gation, livestock watering, and industrial use.1 7 Other factors
also affect the migration rate of contaminated groundwater. The
viscosity and density of liquid contamination affect the rate of
flow."' Although there are methods for predicting the sizes,
shapes and locations of underground aquifers, the methods are
115 See Pamela King, The Protection of Groundwater and Public Drinking Sup-
plies: Recent Trends in Litigation and Legislation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1649, 1649-50
(1989) (citing SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PROTECTING OUR NA-
TION'S GROUNDWATER: THE NEED FOR BETTER PROGRAM COORDINATION, S. REP.
No. 100-475, 2d Sess. 2 (1988)).
116 Id. See also T. HENDERSON ET AL., GROUNDWATER STRATEGIES FOR STATE
ACTION 2 (1984).
117 See English and Inerfeld, supra note 67, at 136.
118 See McElveen, supra note 39, at 70-71.
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not foolproof. Science has not done terribly well predicting or
explaining the migration of groundwater contamination.'" 9
Although residual groundwater contamination may not create
an immediate or direct threat to public health when the ground-
water is not currently used for drinking water, such contamina-
tion can adversely restrict future groundwater assets. The
contamination may also limit neighboring landowners' ability to
use neighboring parcels of land that could have groundwater
wells. Because groundwater, contaminated or clean, migrates in
unexpected ways, groundwater contamination puts users of other
parcels of land at risk, as well as users of groundwater in other
locations.
When monitoring of a brownfield site shows that contamina-
tion has migrated to off-site groundwater, potential users of that
groundwater must be notified of the existing dangers. If that
groundwater is used for drinking water, users must find alterna-
tive sources of water supply. Even though states can use any of a
number of institutional controls to restrict or prohibit the drilling
of new wells, it is difficult to prohibit or restrict the use of ex-
isting wells, and private property owners are under no obligation
to have the water in their wells tested. Although some states do
provide limited voluntary water testing, more extensive testing
for contaminants is costly and technically difficult.
Some states have dealt with the problem of groundwater con-
tamination by devising a method to take groundwater out of the
cleanup and redevelopment equation. Some states have estab-
lished "classified exemption areas" or areas of "urban settings
designation" in which the state agency recognized that the
groundwater in the area is universally contaminated and will not
be suitable for drinking. 120 In these areas, program participants
are not held responsible for the condition of the groundwater.
For example, some brownfield sites in urban areas rely on
community water systems to supply residents with safe drinking
water.121 Beneath those sites, groundwater that contains chemi-
119 In addition to the fundamental difficulty of predicting groundwater flow rates
and direction, certain types of contamination do not travel at the same rate as the
water. Contamination can be more dense than water, and can get absorbed into
porous rock for release at a later time. See Linly Terris and David Rees, CERCLA
Remedy Selection: Abandoning the Quick Fix Mentality, 21 ECOLOGY L. Q. 785, 830
(1994).
120 See Schnapf, supra note 45, at 253. See also McElveen, supra note 39, at 70.
121 See OHIO GOVERNOR's REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
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cals from prior industrial activities is not currently being used for
drinking water purposes and will not be used for those purposes
in the foreseeable future.122 For these sites, Ohio EPA will issue
a groundwater classification known as an Urban Setting Designa-
tion (USD). 123 This classification presumes that at these sites,
cleaning up groundwater to drinking water standards is not nec-
essary because no one will be drinking the groundwater. 124
Other possible exposurqs to contaminated groundwater still
must be addressed even with an USD. 125 For example, if con-
taminated groundwater makes its way to a stream, the resulting
discharge cannot cause adverse impact on the aquatic life in the
stream, nor can it harm people who might swim in the water.1 26
In Ohio's brownfields program a certified professional must
obtain an USD from Ohio EPA127 with respect to the ground-
water below the site in order to release the volunteer from
cleanup of ground water. To receive an USD, the property or
properties must satisfy certain threshold criteria. The sites must
be entirely within cities or towns with a population of twenty
thousand or more residents. 128 At least ninety percent of the city
or township must be connected to a community water supply. 129
Except in certain circumstances, Ohio EPA cannot grant an USD
for a site that is located in an Ohio EPA designated wellhead
122 See OHIO GOVERNOR's REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
123 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at OH.01[2]. See also OHIO
GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 67.
12 4 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at OH.01 [2].
1 25 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at OH.01[2].
12 6 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at OH.01[2].
127 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(1) (2000). The request for the approval
of an urban setting designation must be in writing and must include, at a minimum,
the following: a cover letter, which includes the name and address of the volun-
teer(s); a description of the location and size of the site, and if known, whether the
legislative authority of the city or township where the site is located is in favor of or
in opposition to the USD; an affidavit by the certified professional affirming that the
urban setting threshold criteria are met; attached true and accurate copies of all
documents which form the basis of the certified professional's determination that
the USD threshold criteria have been met; attached true and accurate copy of a legal
description of the proposed USD site; and notice as required by OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(b). OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(a)(i)-(iii).
128 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(1)(a).
129 However, if less than ninety percent but at least seventy-five percent of the
township or city is on a community water supply, and as long as the parcels of land
not connected to the community water supply are not and will not be affected by
hazardous substances or petroleum on or emanating from the site, then the certified
professional may still request an USD. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-
10(D)(1)(b).
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protection area. 13° The USD is usually also inappropriate when
drinking water wells are located within one-half mile of the site
boundary. 131 However, even under these circumstances, the cer-
tified professional may sometimes still request the USD. 3 2
When a site is located over a sole source aquifer 133 in a consoli-
dated saturated zone13 4 or an unconsolidated saturated zone 13 5
capable of sustaining a yield greater than one hundred gallons
per minute, the certified professional must demonstrate that
there is no reasonable expectation that any drinking water wells
will be located within one-half mile of the site.1 36 The certified
professional must consider several criteria to make this
determination. 137
130 The exception to this rule is when the owner of the community water system
has endorsed a wellhead protection plan for that wellhead protection area and the
owner consents in writing to the urban setting designation. OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§ 3745-300-10(D)(1)(c).
131 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(1)(d).
132 First, the drinking water wells must be community water system supply wells
with a wellhead protection plan that complies with Ohio EPA's wellhead protection
program, and the owner of the public water system must consent in writing to the
USD. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-1O(D)(1)(d)(i). Second, the certified profes-
sional must demonstrate that the capture zones of any wells installed or used for
drinking water within one-half mile of the site do not extend under the site. OHIO
ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(1)(d)(ii). The "capture zone" is "all unsaturated
and saturated subsurface areas that presently contribute or will contribute ground
water to a well." OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(A)(1).
133 A "sole source aquifer" is "an aquifer designated as a sole source aquifer
under section 1424(E) of the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974) at 42 U.S.C. 300F, as
amended." OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(A)(6).
134 A "consolidated saturated zone" is a "saturated zone in bedrock." OHIO AD-
MIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(A)(2). The "saturated zone" is a "part or layer of the
earth's crust, excluding the capillary zone, in which all voids are filled with water."
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(A)(5).
135 An "unconsolidated saturated zone" is "any saturated zone that is not in bed-
rock, including, but not limited to, saturated zones in soil, gravel, sand, silt, clay or
fill materials." OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(A)(7).
136 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(1)(e).
137 First, there must be "legally enforceable, reliable restrictions on ground water
use," not including those imposed on wellhead protection or for ground water pro-
tection purposes. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(1)(e)(i). The certified pro-
fessional must consider whether current land use patterns within one-half mile of the
site or ground water quality make development of a well impractical. OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(1)(e)(ii). The certified professional must also consider
whether ninety percent of more of the parcels within one-half mile of the site are
connected to a community water system. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-
10(D)(1)(e)(iii). The final criteria is whether the capture zone of any wells that
could reasonably be expected to be installed or used within one-half mile of the site
would not extend under the site. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(1)(e)(iv).
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Upon receipt of a request for approval of an urban setting
Ohio EPA may request any additional information from any of a
number of parties,138 and may hold a public meeting on the ques-
tion of the designation. 139 Prior to approving an USD, Ohio
EPA must consult with the local legislative authority of the city
or township. 4 ° In addition to considering the five threshold cri-
teria,141 Ohio EPA may also consider the potential impact of the
USD on jurisdictions surrounding the site,142 the potential impact
of the USD on regional water resource needs, and the consis-
tency of the USD with existing regional water resource obliga-
tions of the city or township where the site is located.143
Another critical factor that the Ohio EPA may consider is
whether residents in the region of the site are not currently using
the groundwater for drinking, and are not reasonably expected to
use the groundwater in the future, such that the risk of exposure
to humans as a result of the USD is very low.14 4 Similarly, the
Ohio EPA Director may also consider the availability and feasi-
bility of community water treatment systems that are capable of
preventing exposures to groundwater with concentrations of
chemical(s) of concern in excess of drinking water standards. 45
Additionally, the Ohio EPA may consider any other relevant in-
formation to determine whether the USD will be sufficiently
"protective of public health, safety, and the environment.' ' 146
Pennsylvania does not have a groundwater classification like
Ohio's Voluntary Action Program, although it appears to con-
template lesser cleanup standards for groundwater not in an aq-
uifer. Pennsylvania's program allows volunteers to select
background, statewide, or site-specific cleanup standards; volun-
teers in Pennsylvania may also select a combination of these
138 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(c).
13 9 
Id.
140 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(d). The director may only approve
or disapprove the request of approval of an USD after meeting with the local legisla-
ture. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(e) (emphasis added). Additionally,
the director may extend the time for considering the request for approval of a USD.
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(g).
141 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(e)(i).
142 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(e)(ii).
143 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(e)(iii).
144 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(e)(iv), (v). This includes criteria on
how to determine whether ground water in the region or area of the site will be used
as a future source of drinking water.
145 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(e)(vi).
146 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-10(D)(2)(e)(vii).
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standards. The background standard requires the cleanup to at-
tain those background standards for each contaminant in each
environmental medium, including soil or groundwater. 147 Under
statewide health standards, the cleanup must attain levels of reg-
ulated substances prescribed by the state associated with the spe-
cific environmental medium such as soil and groundwater. 148 For
site-specific standards, the volunteer must develop cleanup levels
specifically for the individual site based on the contaminants, ex-
posures, and conditions unique to that site. 49
For groundwater in aquifers, the current and probable future
use of groundwater must be identified and protected.'
"[N]atural environmental conditions affecting the fate and trans-
port of contaminants, such as natural attenuation, shall be deter-
mined by appropriate scientific methods." 15' Additionally,
Pennsylvania requires that "[g]roundwater not in aquifers be
evaluated using current or probable future exposure scenarios"
and that appropriate management actions be "instituted at the
point of exposure where a person may be exposed to ground-
water by ingestion or other avenues to protect human health and
the environment., 15
2
However, for special industrial areas, 53 the standards are
more lenient than the other three categories, including the stan-
dards for groundwater cleanup. In these areas, a volunteer may
use treatment, storage, containment, or control methods, or any
147 25 PA. CODE § 250.201-250.204 (2000).
148 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303; 25 PA. CODE §§ 250.301-250.312.
149 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304. See 25 PA. CODE § 250.401-250.411. "For
known or suspected carcinogens, soil and groundwater cleanup standards shall be
established at exposures which represent an excess upper-bound life-time risk of
between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 1,000,000. The cumulative excess risk to exposed popu-
lations, including sensitive subgroups, shall not be greater than 1 in 10,000." PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 6026.304 (b).
150 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 6026.304(d)(1)(i).
151 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 6026.304(d)(1)(iii).
152 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 6026.304(d)(2).
153 Participation in the special industrial areas program for voluntary cleanups is
limited to persons who are not deemed responsible for contamination of the site.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.305(a). Sites that are eligible for the program include
'properties used for industrial activities where there are no financially viable respon-
sible persons to clean up the site or where the land is located within an enterprise
zone. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.305(a); 25 PA. CODE § 250.502. An enterprise
zone or targeted community is a geographical area designated by the Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development as deserving of special con-
sideration because of one or more adverse economic factors. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§ 393.22.
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combination of these methods to address site contamination as
long as the remediation protects against any immediate, direct, or
imminent threats to public health or the environment. 54 If
groundwater is to be used at the site, it must either be
remediated in-ground or at the point-of-use so that it is safe for
its intended use. If the property use changes to residential use or
to another use that may create a substantial change in exposure
conditions, then further remediation may be required. 55
Therefore, lthough states do consider, in various ways, the ef-
fects of migrating groundwater contamination, the programs vary
in the quality with which they do this. As noted, some programs
essentially write off contaminated groundwater as hopeless, espe-
cially when it is unlikely that the groundwater will be used. How-
ever, because the science of groundwater migration is imprecise
at best, site-based standards and risk-based standards that do not
require groundwater remediation may be inappropriate in some
circumstances.
3. Environmental Justice Implications
Although our environmental laws have helped improve the
conditions in which we live and work, many Americans still
work, live, and play in unhealthy and unsafe environments. 56 In
fact, many brownfields are located in poor or minority communi-
ties, especially in urban areas. 157 Numerous studies have indi-
cated that those who live closest to sites with the worst air and
15 4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.305(a).
155 25 PA. CODE § 250.503(e).
156 See Luke W. Cole and Richard Moore, Attacks on EPA Unfair, USA TODAY,
July 20, 1998, at 14A.
157 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE STATE OF THE STATES ON
BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES 4
(1995) [hereinafter OTA Report]. I note that in addition to hosting contaminated,
abandoned industrial sites, low-income communities host a disproportionate number
of older polluting facilities. These older polluting facilities are subject to lower oper-
ating standards than those that apply to newer facilities of the same type, and there-
fore present disproportionate environmental risk and harm to the surrounding low-
income and minority communities. See Heidi G. Robertson, If Your Grandfather
Could Pollute, So Can You: Environmental Grandfather Clauses and their Role in
Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 131 (1995). See also ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION AGENCY FINAL REPORT: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, URBAN RE-
VITALIZATION, AND BROWNFIELDS: THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE:
A REPORT ON THE "PUBLIC DIALOGUES ON URBAN REVITALIZATION AND
BROWNFIELDS: ENVISIONING HEALTHY AND SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES." EPA
DOCUMENT NUMBER: EPA 500-R-96-002 (Dec. 1996) [hereinafter PUBLIC
DIALOGUES].
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water pollution, highest levels of lead contamination and pesti-
cide poisoning, and lowest level of environmental enforcement
are low-income and minority communities.' 58 Because these
sites are often abandoned, they leave behind not only environ-
mental and health troubles, but economic and aesthetic issues as
well. As a result, local residents suffer all of the problems these
sites present: blight on the landscape, potential environmental
dangers, decreased tax base, and loss of jobs.1 59
Some argue that cleaning up these sites will spur economic de-
velopment and rejuvenate these neighborhoods. 6 ° Communities
would benefit from new jobs, an improved tax base and further
economic development, in addition to the environmental benefit
of a cleaner site.6 So, many environmental justice advocates
support efforts to redevelop brownfields.162 And although the
initial promise of job creation and economic renewal leads many
low-income and minority communities to support brownfields re-
development programs, the use of risk-based cleanup standards
may dampen their enthusiasm. The possibility that the cleanup
standards applied to these sites will be lower than those for sites
near suburban, non-minority communities raises environmental
justice concerns and leads some communities to distrust and dis-
favor the programs.
As discussed above, efforts in most states to make the
brownfields cleanup process efficient include options for cleanup
standards that allow for less than total site remediation1 63 This
can happen in two ways. First, risk-based cleanup standards al-
158 See Cole and Moore, supra note 156. See also Georgette C. Poindexter, Sepa-
rate and Unequal: A Comment on the Urban Development Aspect of Brownfields
Programs, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 9 (1996).
159 See PUBLIC DIALOGUES, supra note 157.
160 See Andrew, supra note 10, at 27. See also PUBLIC DIALOGUES, supra note
157.
161 See Andrew, supra note 10, at 27. See also PUBLIC DIALOGUES, supra note
157.
162 See John Rosenthal, Panel Discussion at ABA Satellite Seminar, Brownfields
Redevelopment: Cleaning up the Urban Environment (Mar. 7, 1996). See also John
Rosenthal, Change Cleanup Standards If and Only If, THE ENvTL. FORUM, May-
June 1995 at 28, 33. John Rosenthal, Director of the NAACP Environmental Justice
Program writes that [T]he NAACP favors changes in ... standards for brownfields,
if and only if the revisions actually generate faster cleanups in people of color com-
munities." Rosenthal, id. at 34; E. Lynn Grayson, Brownfields Redevelopment and
Environmental Justice: Conflicting Initiatives?, ABA SEC. NAT. RESOURCES, EN-
ERGY & ENVTL. L. NEWSLE'-rER, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 6; PUBLIC DIALOGUES, supra
note 157.
163 See supra note 7, and accompanying text.
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low landowners to remediate a site to an industrial or commer-
cial standard, which is less clean than a residential standard
would require, when the landowner intends to use the site for
commercial or industrial purposes. Therefore, the risk-based
standards available in many brownfields programs allow less ex-
tensive treatment of sites than the numeric health-based stan-
dards required under federal and state mandatory cleanup
programs. Second, the lower standards of cleanup often permit
cleanup methods that allow contamination to be masked rather
than truly remediated. 64
Brownfields programs that allow liability shields for site clean-
ups that meet standards less stringent than the most rigorous
available have come under attack as violating efforts to achieve
environmental justice.165 Some environmental justice advocates
are concerned that the use of risk-based standards will lead to
substandard cleanups in low-income and minority neighborhoods
where many brownfield sites are located.' 66 Although flexible
standards exist only at the state level, the federal EPA usually
defers to state decision-makers on these issues, and compliance
with a state risk-based standard will often essentially shield a site
owner from federal as well as state liability. 167
Risk-based standards ask low income and minority communi-
ties to accept lower cleanup standards and the consequent higher
risk to health and the environment in exchange for economic de-
164 See CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COLLATON, COMING CLEAN FOR Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 4-5 (1996) [hereinafter COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT]. See also BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7.
165 See Samara F. Swanston, An Environmental Justice Perspective on Superfund
Reauthorization, 9 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 565, 566-71 (1996) (arguing that flexible
cleanup standards will put low-income and minority communities at risk of increased
exposure to environmental hazards).
166 See Rodger C. Field, Siting, Justice, and the Environmental Laws, 16 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 639 (1996) (arguing that certain measures can help alleviate the environ-
mental justice concerns attached to brownfields redevelopment programs). See also
Working Draft of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council Report
(Jan. 31, 1996).
167 See Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75
(1996) (arguing that the current debate on brownfields redevelopment legislation is
a microcosm of the environmental racism debate). Note that EPA has not abdicated
its authority in any way to bring enforcement actions under CERCLA in cases of
inadequate cleanup. It has, however, entered into agreements with many states in
which EPA agrees not to enforce against sites complying with state cleanup
programs.
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velopment. 168 However, even the standards set for a brownfield
cleanup on a site-specific basis must at a minimum be protective
of human health, according to the intended land use. The justifi-
cation for accepting this trade-off is that without brownfields pro-
grams, many of these sites would not be cleaned up at all, not
even to the risk-based, site-specific standards. Brownfields sites
would remain abandoned, contaminated blights on their commu-
nities, leaving those neighboring communities suffering far more
than exposure to contamination. They would suffer the eco-
nomic and aesthetic burden as well. Finally, by their very nature,
brownfields are not the most severely contaminated properties;
they are by definition the less contaminated properties not sub-
ject to any state or federal enforcement action.' 69
Decision-makers must encourage community participation in
decision-making processes and consider overall community goals
in determining how to cleanup a site. 170 Residents of affected
communities should have some input into the remediation pro-
posals and decision-making processes that lead to brownfield
cleanups according to risk-based standards.' 7 ' Residents could
help decision-makers determine whether the economic and other
values of partial cleanup outweigh the fact that the cleanup will
leave some contamination in their midst.
Unfortunately, many communities feel pressure to accept envi-
ronmentally unfriendly industries and less stringent cleanup stan-
dards because they see the alternative as no industry (or jobs)
and no cleanup. 172 Environmental justice concerns would be bet-
ter addressed if residents in affected neighborhoods could voice
their opinions regarding whether enhancements to the commu-
nity as a whole warrant accepting reduced cleanup standards.173
168 See Stephen M. Johnson, The Brownfields Action Agenda: A Model for Future
Federal/State Cooperation in the Quest for Environmental Justice?, 37 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 85 (1997). See also Grayson, supra note 162; Poindexter, supra note 158, at
63.
169 See Johnson, supra note 168, at n.82 (citing Thomas W. Devine, Remarks at
ABA Satellite Seminar, Brownfields Redevelopment: Cleaning Up the Urban Envi-
ronment (Mar. 7, 1996). See also Linda K. Breggin & John Pendergrass, Voluntary
and Brownfield Remediation Programs: An Overview of the Environmental Law In-
stitute's 1998 Research, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,339, 10,339-40 (1999).
170 See Field, supra note 166, at 652-53.
171 See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs to Comply
with Title VI, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 119 (2000).
172 See Vogel, supra note 8, at 120.
173 See Vogel, supra note 8, at 120 (citing Environmental Justice: Brownfields Initi-
ative Grants Citizens New Opportunities to Voice Concerns, HAZARDOUS WASTE
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An agency could achieve this through a notice and comment pe-
riod prior to an agency approving a liability release, or even per-
haps, by allowing a community to approve or disapprove of a
brownfields cleanup plan.
Although no state gives a community that level of involve-
ment, some states have built consideration of environmental jus-
tice implications into their programs. For example, in
Massachusetts, when entering into a Covenant Not to Sue, the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection must
give first priority to sites located in the fifteen cities with the
highest poverty rates in the state. Second priority goes to sites
located in economically distressed areas of the remaining munici-
palities,' 74 and third priority to sites located in any remaining
municipalities. 175 Many other states, however, have created a de-
cision-making process that is so focused on the private sector that
the public has great difficulty playing any role at all. For exam-
ple, in Ohio it is virtually impossible for the public to play a role
in a VAP cleanup. Because the private landowner hires a private
consultant to plan and carry out the cleanup, the state may be
unaware of the cleanup until the Ohio EPA receives a No Fur-
ther Action letter from a certified professional. 76 On the basis
of that letter the Ohio EPA issues a Covenant Not to Sue. 177
There is no room for the public in this process, and as a result,
affected communities have little voice.
Notwithstanding the environmental justice concerns raised by
the legislative innovation of risk-based cleanup standards,
brownfields redevelopment programs can be a positive force in
combating the effects of past environmental racism, despite the
application of risk-based standards. 178 This is so because, even
NEWS, June 9, 1997 (explaining that historically, minority and low-income residents
had little interaction with developers)).
174 An economically distressed area is an area of a municipality that has been
designated as an economic target area or that would otherwise meet the criteria for
such designation pursuant to Massachusetts General Law ch. 23A, § 3D, or that is
the site of a former manufactured gas plant. MASS GEN. LAWS ch 21E, § 2 (Law.
Co-op. 1996 & Supp. 2000).
175 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch 21E, § 3A (j)(2)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1996 & Supp. 2000).
176 In some cases, however, the Ohio EPA is involved from the start. These cases
tend to be the more complicated cases where the volunteer remediator and the certi-
fied professional overseeing the project seek technical assistance from the agency.
177 OHIO REV. CODE A, N. § 3746.12(A) (2000).
178 See James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner-City
Jobs: Indiana's Urban In-Fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43, 46-48 (1994).
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taking into account the potential negative health effects of risk-
based standards, the programs can, by facilitating rebirth of
abandoned sites, encourage job creation and improved econo-
mies in low-income and/or minority communities. To do this in
an environmentally just manner, risk-based standards must be
sufficiently rigorous to protect human health and the environ-
ment in every community in which brownfields appear. Cleanup
standards must be rigorous enough at all sites to ensure adequate
control of pollution in any community, but especially in commu-
nities already burdened with a disproportionate share of
contamination. 79
D. The Risk-Based Standards Innovation: Conclusion
Brownfields redevelopment programs using risk-based stan-
dards as an incentive for redevelopment fail to provide for per-
manent and complete remediation of land. This is particularly
apparent when a landowner cleans a property to industrial or
commercial standards rather than to the more stringent stan-
dards applicable to land intended for residential use. 8 °
However, risk-based standards present a capital savings to the
volunteer remediator. This is so because these standards allow
landowners profitable use of their land following a cleanup that
is less expensive than it would have been under more stringent
cleanup standards. 81 Some argue that this financial incentive oc-
curs at the expense of the health and environment in the lower
income and minority communities that often are neighbors to
brownfields land. It may also occur at the expense of future gen-
erations of landowners.
Brownfields programs that allow risk-based cleanup standards
turn the state into an additional land use regulator. The state
becomes a land use regulator because it must ensure that future
land use is restricted to the intended use that determined the
cleanup standard. 82 If a subsequent owner of the land chooses
to use the land for a different category of land use, the state must
ensure that the landowner cleans the land accordingly.
179 See Field, supra note 166, at 652.
180 See Dinsmore, supra note 18, at 40. See also COMING CLEAN FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 164.
181 See Dinsmore, supra note 18, at 40.
182 See Dinsmore, supra note 18, at 40.
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Finally, brownfields programs with risk-based cleanup stan-
dards leave minority communities in environments that, although
cleaner than before the brownfields cleanup, are less clean than
they might have been under more stringent cleanup standards.
The benefits communities are supposed to derive in exchange for
the above concessions are reputed to include numerous
redeveloped brownfield sites, and the jobs and other economic
benefits that accompany them. Risk-based cleanup standards
probably drive some properties into redeveloped circulation
sooner than they might otherwise arrive there, and their cleanups
certainly are more cost effective than those for which the more
stringent cleanup standards apply. However, because it is impos-
sible to guarantee eternal land use restrictions, states should use
site-specific, use-based standards sparingly183 and make every ef-
fort to protect current neighbors and future users of the land. If
we find that brownfields redevelopment is a significant benefit to
low-income or minority communities, perhaps state programs
should offer incentives, or special benefits, to persons opting to
redevelop in a minority community that suffers a disproportion-
ate environmental burden. Perhaps this benefit should accrue if
the volunteer opts to remediate the property to a higher degree
than is required by law, thus improving both the economic and
environmental outlooks of the surrounding minority community.
Even with the availability of risk-based standards, state
brownfields programs are not seeing the kinds of significant use
proponents hoped for. Despite the improved efficiencies in cost
and time, landowners are not rushing to take advantage of the
brownfields programs with risk-based cleanup standards. Even if
they were, the externalized costs that risk-based cleanups leave
behind raise questions about the positive effects these programs
can have. For these reasons, innovative risk-based cleanup stan-
dards are not the anticipated catalysts of urban renewal, and al-
though such standards have encouraged some cleanups, they
carry with them dangers that states must address to make their
use safe, fair, and effective.
There are several reasons why these programs are not as effec-
tive as they might be, even with the cost savings and liability re-
ductions they provide. Some might argue that even the risk-
based standards are too high and costly-but reducing them
183 See Denworth, supra note 18, at 30.
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would exacerbate the problems discussed above. Some might ar-
gue that the liability releases states provide are not sufficiently
protective. Without protection from liability to the federal gov-
ernment, other state agencies, and third parties, this may well be
true. Perhaps, as I have argued elsewhere, cleanup costs and lia-
bility protection, which address environmental concerns, are just
parts of the complicated reasons why brownfields sites go un-
remediated. Brownfields programs must address non-environ-
mental barriers to redevelopment to succeed at a higher level.
However, cleanups have occurred under these programs that
may not otherwise have occurred. With a better understanding
of the externalized costs of partial cleanups, states can reduce
those costs while retaining the cost saving characteristic that
helps encourage cleanup.
II
PRIVATIZATION IN SITE ASSESSMENT AND
OVERSIGHT: ABDICATION OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY
OR A REASONABLE DELEGATION?
In its broadest sense, "[p]rivatization means increased govern-
mental reliance on the private sector, rather than on government
agencies, to satisfy the needs of society." '184 Primarily, however,
there are three types of privatization of government functions.
The first is the sale of government assets to the private sector.185
The second is "contracting out," where the government contracts
with private entities to carry out certain tasks.1 86 And the third is
vouchers, where the government provides funds to citizens and
allows them to choose a private provider of applicable ser-
vices."' The federal government has encouraged contracting out
since President Eisenhower approved a policy stating: "[Tihe
Federal government will not start or carry on any commercial
activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such
product or service can be procured from private enterprise
through ordinary business channels." '188
184 See E.S. Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1987).
185 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD
MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (1988) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION
REPORT], at 1-2. This is also called "denationalization," or divestment of state-
owned enterprises. See Savas, supra note 184, at 889.186 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 1-2.
187 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 1-2.
1 8 8
PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 1.
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These privatization methods have been widespread at the state
and local levels as well, reportedly with considerable cost savings
both to government and consumers. 89 In addition to the three
major forms of privatization, governments have increased the
role of the private sector in various other ways, and to lesser de-
grees, by using franchise arrangements, free-market arrange-
ments, and voluntary efforts.190
Outside the area of brownfields redevelopment, one study of
the effectiveness of various forms of privatization found that ju-
risdictions contracted out, either in whole or in part, twenty-
seven of the fifty-nine services examined.' 9' Further, the public
officials that contracted for private services have, in large part,
been satisfied with the results.1 92 In both large and small juris-
dictions, the survey indicated that in varying degrees the priva-
tization of the services led to better services and reduced costs.' 93
President Ronald Reagan's Commission on Privatization
(Commission) studied the basic forms of privatization and identi-
fied areas of government that could be more effectively per-
formed by the private sector.194 The Commission's goal was to
evaluate the needs of Americans for services in, for example, ed-
ucation, lending, health care, transportation, and social ser-
vices, 95 and to weigh the risk that private efforts would fail
against the costs of alleged failures of existing government ef-
forts.' 96 Though the Commission recommended numerous areas
where privatization would improve services, cost, and efficiency,
the Commission's report clearly acknowledges that the govern-
ment's role as policy-maker and "creator and enforcer of stan-
dards must never be compromised.' 97 .
For purposes of this article, the next question is what type of
privatization, or expansion of the role of the private sector,
should exist in state brownfields programs. In most states, priva-
tization is not exactly contracting out, that is, where the govern-
1 89 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 1-3.
190 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 1-3.
191 See Savas, supra note 184, at 890.
192 See Savas, supra note 184, at 893.
193 See Savas, supra note 184, at 894-95.
194 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185. The Commission that
wrote this report was created by President Ronald Reagan in Executive Order No.
12,607 (September 2, 1987).
195 See PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185 at xi.
196 See PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185 at xi.
197 See PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at xi.
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ment enters into a contract with a private company to provide
services on the government's behalf. In such cases state environ-
mental agencies would enter into contracts with environmental
consultants for inspections or cleanup oversight. Instead, in
Ohio, the state mandates that participants in its brownfields
cleanup program contract on their own with private parties,198 so
at least for Ohio, calling it privatization might be a bit of a
stretch. Ohio requires that program participants use the public
sector to verify and validate the carrying out of state standards,
and the state relies on the judgment of these private parties when
it releases participants from liability for contamination at the
site.199 Though perhaps not privatization in its strictest sense,
Ohio's system is, at minimum, a close cousin of the traditional
privatization models outlined above.
Because most state programs are not quite as "privatized" as
Ohio's, and because in those states we still see state agencies
more clearly exercising their own decision-making authority, per-
haps it is more accurate to identify these arrangements as a form
of private/public partnership. This Article uses the term "priva-
tization" in its broadest, most inclusive sense, because state
brownfields laws require or allow program participants to use
private parties in various ways. Only the most "privatized" pro-
gram requires private parties to effectively make decisions on be-
half of the state.
A. Privatization in State Brownfields Programs:
Ohio and Others
This Section will describe the various forms of privatization
that appear in state brownfields programs. It will start with the
more privatized of the programs, then describe some of the uses
of privatization in states that retain more control within the
agency. This Section will then use privatization in other areas of
government to help suggest areas of concern with respect to the
way privatization is used in some states, and suggest changes that
would reduce the negative effects of the particular form of priva-
tization. Specifically, this Section will present lessons learned
from the use of privatization in the criminal justice system and in
state motor vehicle inspection programs. Finally, it will apply
198 See OHIO REV. CODE § 3746.071; OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-05.
1 99 See OHIO REv. CODE § 3746.12(A).
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those lessons to the uses of privatization in state brownfields
programs.
Ohio's brownfields program is innovative in its efforts to en-
courage redevelopment, partly because the program requires
participants to use private individuals, called "certified profes-
sionals," to carry out tasks and make decisions that have tradi-
tionally been government responsibilities.2 °° Unlike programs in
most other states, the statutes and regulations in Ohio's program
do not provide for direct agency oversight of site assessments or
cleanups.20 Instead, the Ohio program relies on private parties
to investigate, coordinate, implement, and evaluate the cleanup
of participating properties.20 2
Volunteer participants in Ohio's VAP must contract with a cer-
tified professional and certified laboratory to oversee Phase I
and, if necessary, Phase II site assessments.20 3 If there is no evi-
dence of contamination after an initial site assessment, a certified
professional may issue a No Further Action letter. Certified pro-
fessionals are "certified" by Ohio EPA and have the authority to
issue No Further Action letters.2 4 A No Further Action letter is
200 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10(B)(1)(b) (West 1998). The Massachusetts
brownfields law provides for the use of licensed professionals, but the approach in
that law is significantly different because of its use of a "tiered" system. Because of
the tiered system, the Massachusetts program has more oversight than Ohio's Vol-
untary Action Program (VAP). See 1998 Mass. Acts 206; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310
§ 40.000 (2000).
201 See BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACrICE, supra note 7, at § OH.01(2)(c). How-
ever, in its effort to secure a Memorandum of Agreement with EPA Region 5, which
would provide some comfort for VAP participants with respect to federal liability,
Ohio EPA has recently proposed to implement an alternative voluntary cleanup pro-
gram alongside its classic VAP. Ohio EPA's proposal would allow volunteer partici-
pants to opt for an "MOA Track". Sites participating in the MOA Track would be
subject to more agency involvement and oversight than those sites in the "Classic
VAP." Although Ohio EPA has proposed the MOA Track in its application to EPA
for a memorandum of agreement, this program has not been approved by EPA,
Region 5. See Ohio EPA website at <http://www.epa.state.oh.us/derr/vap/moa/moa.
html> (last visited September 26, 2000). See also notes 242 and 243 for further infor-
mation regarding Ohio's proposed "MOA Track".
202 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10(B)(1)(b) (2000). The certification require-
ments for certified professionals are at OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-05(B)
(2000).
203 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10(B)(1)(a), (b). See also Daniel Michel, Com-
ment: The CERCLA Paradox and Ohio's Response to the Brownfield Problem: Sen-
ate Bill 221, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 435, 456 (1995) (including an overview of Ohio's
brownfields program).
204 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.07(D) (sets forth standards for certified profes-
sionals to apply before the enactment of the applicable regulations). Current regula-
tions are at OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3745-300-05. See also R. Michael Sweeney,
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a collection of forms, documents, and affidavits, 20 5 which collec-
tively state that according to the scientific judgment of the certi-
fied professional, the property in question meets the applicable
cleanup standards and no further cleanup measures are neces-
sary.2 °6 If the Phase I site assessment 20 7 indicates that hazardous
substances or petroleum have been treated, stored, managed, or
disposed of on the property, the property owner must continue
the assessment process to the Phase II site assessment level
20 8
and also complete a cleanup.
When site cleanup work is completed to the certified profes-
sional's satisfaction, the certified professional completes a No
Further Action letter and submits it to the Ohio EPA.20 9 In ex-
change, the Ohio EPA grants the volunteer participant a Cove-
Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 101, 125
(Sept. 1995).
205 A sample No Further Action form and Instructions for Completion of the
NFA form are available at <http://www.epa.state.oh.us/derr/vap/noaction/noaction.
html> (last visited September 26, 2000).
20 6 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10(A); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-13. See
also E. Lynn Grayson and Stephen A.K. Palmer, The Brownfields Phenomenon: An
Analysis of Environmental, Economic, and Community Concerns, 25 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,337 (1995).
207 A Phase I assessment includes:
a. Review and analysis of deeds, mortgages, easements of record, and simi-
lar documents relating to the chain of title;
b. Review and analysis of previous assessments, studies, or geologic studies
of the property and within two thousand feet that are publicly or reasona-
bly available to the Owner or Operator;
c. Review of environmental compliance histories of persons who owned or
operated the property;
d. Review of aerial photography;
e. Interviews with managers;
f. Conducting a walkover inspection; and
g. Identifying current and past uses of property, adjoining tracks, and sur-
rounding area, including interviews with neighboring residents or
employees.
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-06 (2000).
208 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-07(A)(1) (1998). See also Amy Yersavich,
About Ohio's Voluntary Action Program (visited April 1, 2001) <http://www.epa.
state.oh.us/derr/vap/aboutvap/aboutvap.html>. See also Michel, supra note 203.
209 A complete NFA Letter includes proper completion of the "NFA Form", as
well as an Executive Summary of the NFA Letter, attachment of NFA Documenta-
tion (e.g. risk assessment report, maps, Phase I and Phase II information, and other
information referred to in the NFA Form), and payment of applicable fees. Ohio
EPA, Division of Emergency and Remedial Response, Voluntary Action Program,
Instructions for Certified Professional to Use to Prepare a NFA Letter and the At-
tached NFA Form in the Format required by Ohio Administrative Code 3745-300-
13(H), available at <http://www.epa.state.oh.us/derr/vap/noaction/noaction.html>.
See also OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-13 (2000).
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nant Not to Sue (Covenant).21 ° This Covenant limits the
property owner's legal liability to the Ohio EPA for future clean
up of the property.211 In particular, the Covenant guarantees to
the volunteer remediator that the Ohio EPA will not require ad-
ditional future remedial activities at the site,2 12 and thus limits
the property owner's environmental liability to the Ohio EPA
with respect to that site.213 The Covenant runs with the land 14
and protects current and future owners from liability to the Ohio
EPA for existing contamination, provided the contamination
levels do not increase beyond those levels existing at the issuance
of the Covenant.215 The Ohio EPA enforces compliance with the
standards by sorting the submitted No Further Action letters into
audit categories,216 and conducting audits of approximately
210 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(A); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-13.
211 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746-12(A).
212 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(A). Michel, supra note 203, at 456.
213 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(A).
214 This means that the covenant applies to future owners of the site as well as to
the current owner. To run with the land, the covenant must be recorded with the
deed to the property along with any additional site restrictions that may also be
applicable.
215 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(B). See also Michel, supra note 203, at 456.
216 Pursuant to Ohio Adminstrative Code § 3745-300-14, Ohio EPA initially
places each NFA letter into one of three pools for possible audit. The "mandatory
audit pool" applies to NFA letters issued in the preceding calendar year to which
any of the following apply: the work in support of the NFA was carried out either by
a "certified professional" or "certified laboratory" that was certified through the
interim program provisions and not under final program rules; there is any evidence
of fraudulent work used to produce the NFA letter; the certification of the "certified
professional" who issued the NFA letter or of the "certified laboratory" which per-
formed laboratory analysis in support of the NFA letter was subsequently revoked;
or the NFA letter was the basis for a Covenant Not to Sue which was subsequently
revoked. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-14(A)(4). The Director of Ohio EPA au-
dits all NFA letters in the mandatory audit pool.
The "priority audit pool" applies to NFA letters issued in the preceding calendar
year to which either of the following applies: a risk assessment was used to support
the NFA letter; the NFA letter relies upon an engineering control; or an institutional
control as a remedy to meet applicable standards at the site. OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§ 3745-300-14(A)(5).
The "random audit pool" applies to all the NFA letters issued in the preceding
calendar year which were not selected for the mandatory or priority audit pools.
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-14(A)(6). The Director of Ohio EPA randomly
selects for audit twenty-five percent of the NFA letters contained in the "priority
audit pool." Any NFA letter in the priority audit pool not randomly selected for
audit is included in the appropriate random audit pool. At a minimum, the director
conducts audits of no less than twenty-five percent of all NFA letters involving re-
medial activities, and no less than twenty-five percent of all NFA letters not involv-
ing remedial activities, submitted to the Director during the preceding calendar year.
The Director may conduct audits from the random audit pool as he deems neces-
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twenty-five percent of the sites that received a Covenant in the
previous calendar year.217
This use of certified professionals involves transferring tradi-
tional government functions from the public sector to the private
sector.2 18 Privatization, or even what in this case may fairly be
called a public/private partnership, is supposed to save the
agency money. In the case of brownfields redevelopment pro-
grams, privatization is supposed to provide for high quality site
evaluation and remedial work. 19 It is also supposed to relieve
the environmental agency of cumbersome and time-consuming
oversight and review of voluntary cleanups z.22  This idea, al-
sary. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-14(A). According to Mr. Michael Allen (Tox-
icologist, Ohio EPA Voluntary Action Program, Field Auditing Unit):
The decisions made to classify NFAs among pools to prioritize their likeli-
hood of an audit were made, besides the obvious illegal aspects of the
fraudulent cases, in reference to their complexity. NFAs that use engineer-
ing controls or risk assessments in order to attain applicable standards are
in most cases more complicated and more likely to contain situations where
a greater scrutiny of details is appropriate.
Electronic mail correspondence from Michael Allen to Jennifer Lukas Jackson,
July 5, 2000 (on file with the author).
217 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.17 (West 1998). See Jack Pulley et al., Develop-
ing Brownfield Sites: Comparing Two Approaches, MICHIGAN LAWYERS WEEKLY,
Sept. 25, 1995, at 6. Between 1996 and 1999, Ohio EPA received ninety NFA letters
requesting a Covenant Not to Sue. Ohio EPA categorized one of those NFA letters
into the "mandatory audit pool," and audited that site. Ohio EPA categorized
roughly seventy percent of the remaining NFA letters into the "priority audit pool,"
and audited about thirty percent of those sites. The remaining NFA letters, approxi-
mately thirty percent of the total received were placed in a "random audit pool," of
which Ohio EPA audited twenty-seven percent. In sum, Ohio EPA audited twenty-
seven sites from among the ninety NFA letters it received, or approximately thirty
percent of the total. It appears, therefore, that Ohio EPA has complied with the
twenty-five percent audit requirement. Electronic mail correspondence from
Michael Allen, Toxicologist, Ohio EPA Voluntary Action Program, Field Auditing
Unit, to Jennifer Lukas Jackson July 5, 2000 (on file with the author).2 1 8 See generally PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES (William T. Gormley,
Jr. ed. 1991) (including examples of other forms of government use of privatization).
See also Dana C. Joel, Privatization of Secure Adult Prisons: Issues and Evidence, in
51 PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 53 (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds.
1993).
2 19 See OHIO GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 16. The legislative history
in Ohio regarding the decision to use this privatized system of site evaluation and
cleanup is sparse, but opponent and proponent testimony shed some light on the
reasons for choosing it. See infra notes 220 and 229 and accompanying text. See
also PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES, supra note 218, at 1-24.220 See Testimony Before the Senate Energy, Natural Resources and Environment
Subcommittee (January 5, 1993) (Diane Kohn, Public Affairs Director for the Toledo
Area Chamber of Commerce). See also Elizabeth C. Barton, Privatization of Envi-
ronmental Cleanups, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 25, 1995/Jan. 1, 1996, 13A, at 15A (stating
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though new to environmental law,2 21 is not new to public/private
sector interaction. The federal government has privatized,
among other things, data processing, billing, payroll, training,
regulatory inspections, and background inspections of appointees
to federal offices.22 2 State governments have privatized pris-
223 2ons,  recreational facilities, and transportation.224 Local gov-
ernments have privatized public works, health care, building
security and many other government services.225 Many extol this
that the privatization of key elements of the environmental remediation process in
Connecticut was a calculated move to address backlogs in administrative agencies);
see also PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES, supra note 218, at 1-24.
221 There are certainly other examples of private parties being involved in state or
federal environmental legal processes. For example, the Massachusetts' Toxic Use
Reduction Act (TURA) empowers private parties to certify the Toxics Use Reduc-
tion Plans of "Large Quantity Toxics Users." These parties, called "Toxics Use Re-
duction Planners," must pass a uniform certification examination developed by the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection. Although these private
parties have some decision-making authority, according to the state, the planning
process is a "self-help" provision. This program is a "mandatory-voluntary" pro-
gram which means that although Large Quantity Toxics Users are required to prop-
erly prepare and file a Toxics Use Reduction Plan, there are no mandatory standards
or goals for the plans. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211 (1994 & Supp. 2000); Massa-
chusetts Department of Environmental Protection, Toxics Use Reduction Act Over-
view (visited March 6, 2001) <http://www.state.ma.us/dep/bwp/dhm/tura/turaover/
htm>. See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation:
TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEo. L.J.
257, 354 (2001). Also, although private parties are intimately involved in, among
others, the creation of environmental impact statements under the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA), and Habitat Conservation Plans under the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA), these documents are reviewed and approved by the
applicable government agencies. Because, in the case of TURA, there are no real
applicable standards, and nothing at stake for the user, and in the cases of NEPA
and the ESA, the agencies maintain primary decision-making authority, these exam-
ples are not as instructive with respect to the privatization of decision-making au-
thority in environmental law, as examples outside the field of environmental law.222 See Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Con-
tractors Share the Sovereign's Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 175, 179 (1997). According to Sabatino, federal government privatization has
occurred under Office and Management Circular A-76 which encourages federal
agencies to use private contractors if doing so would cost at least ten percent less
than using a government service. See Performance of Commercial Activities, 61
Fed. Reg. 14,338, 14,338-46 (1996) (reissuing and amending OMB Circular A-76).
See also AL GORE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RE-
SULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND CosTS LESS 56-59
(1993) (recommending that some federal government operations compete directly
with private industry, or when they cannot compete, use private parties to perform
the tasks in question).
223 See infra, section II.A.1.
224 See Sabatino, supra note 222, at 180.
225 See Sabatino, supra note 222, at 181.
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shift towards privatization and public/private partnerships as an
efficient, cost-saving innovation.226 This is partly because compe-
tition with private sources forces government entities to improve
performance.227 Despite these expectations of improved per-
formance and efficiencies, Ohio's program has been called ineffi-
cient and even costly.228
Although some still laud the Ohio brownfields program's use
of the private sector for its theoretical efficiency, its use of certi-
fied professionals may separate responsibility for assessing public
risk one step too far from an accountable public servant.22 9 In
addition, this system could make it difficult for community activ-
ists to obtain full and timely disclosure regarding contamination
at a site.230 This is because when private individuals control
226 See Patricia M. Wald, Looking Forward to the Next Millenium: Social Previews
to Legal Change, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1085 (1997) (describing recent privatizations of
traditional government functions and voicing concern about them, despite their effi-
ciency, due, in part, to liability issues.) See also Sabatino, supra note 222, at 181
n.18, citing, among others, CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS
(1990); PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185.
227 See Sabatino, supra note 222, at 182, citing arguments for school voucher pro-
grams; U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HEHS-96-3, PRI-
VATE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS: EARLY EXPERIENCES IN FOUR SCHOOL
DISTRICTS 28 (1996); Dwight R. Lee, Vouchers-The Key to Meaningful Reform, in
PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES, supra note 218, at 47-49. But see Craig D.
Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public Ac-
cess to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21 (1999) (stating
that although privatization of important government functions, such as safeguarding
federal prisoners, nuclear energy and weapons operations, and privatizing state and
municipally-run airports, may be economically beneficial, this trend poses a threat to
public access to information under the Freedom of Information Act).
228 According to the Plain Dealer (Cleveland), as of 1999, the Agency had not
"seen a single Phase I report submitted the first time that was fully compliant," and
that "[NFA letters] were coming in with so many flaws, violations and errors that
they required many more hours of work than fees were structured to fund." Julie
Carr Smyth, EPA Tries to Rescue Disputed Program, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land), July 8, 2000, at B-1.
229 See Testimony Before the Ohio House Energy and Environment Subcommittee
Re: S.B. 221 (Dec. 15, 1995) (Rick B. Van Landingham III, State Conservation
Chair, and Jeff Skelding, State Program Coordinator, Ohio Chapter of the Sierra
Club).
230 According to Ms. Chris Trepal, Executive Director of the Earth Day Coalition:
"When citizens cannot get information, study, challenge or petition, no one can
responsibly carry out his or her civic duties. Uncontrolled or abandoned waste sites
have a proportionally larger impact on minority and poor people in our community
who are usually the unsuspecting victims of exposure to toxic, hazardous, or radioac-
tive wastes. The lack of real meaningful public participation in decision making en-
sures that these unwilling victims will again be out of the loop." Electronic Mail
Correspondence from Chris Trepal, Executive Director, Earth Day Coalition, to
Jennifer Lukas Jackson (July 24, 2000) (on file with the author).
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much of the brownfields cleanup process, there is little or no op-
portunity for public participation. 3' In Ohio, private profession-
als oversee cleanups and sign-off on their completion. 32 The
Ohio EPA generally receives information about specific sites
only when a volunteer participant or a hired certified profes-
sional calls the agency seeking technical assistance or other infor-
mation.233 Only after the private party submits a No Further
Action letter to the Ohio EPA can the public obtain information
about the applicant site, and to do so is quite difficult. For these
reasons, even people devoted to encouraging brownfields rede-
velopment in Ohio lobbied against the use of certified profes-
sionals in the state's program.234
Another reason critics mistrust the certified professional provi-
sions of Ohio's program is that the requirements for becoming a
"certified professional" are quite weak. 35 Any person who has a
bachelors degree in any of a number of specified sciences, has
good moral character, eight years of relevant experience with
three years in a supervisory position, and professional compe-
tence, may become a certified professional.2 36 In addition, per-
231 For further discussion of public participation in state brownfields programs,
see Kris Wernstedt and Robert Hersh, "Through a Lens Darkly"--Superfund Spec-
tacles on Public Participation at Brownfield Sites, 9 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVI-
RONMENT 153 (1998) (noting that brownfield development complicates participation
processes due to equity concerns, reliance on private property controls to limit expo-
sure to residual contamination, and the fragmented nature of local land use plan-
ning). See also Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental
Decision Making at the New Millenium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence,
26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 263 (1999) (noting that despite positive evolution of
public participation in environmental decision-making, public participation has not
been a priority in brownfields initiatives).
23 2 See OHIO GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 14.
23 3 See OHIO GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 14.
234 Telephone Interview by Heather Tonsing with Virginia Aveni, Project Man-
ager of the Cuyahoga County Planning Commission's Brownfields Working Group
(July 10, 1996).
235 See, however, the Ohio Governor's Report on the Voluntary Action Program,
which characterizes the standards for certified professionals and certified laborato-
ries as "stringent." OHIO GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 16.
236 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-05(B)(2) (2000).
Criteria for certification:
(2) The director will issue a certification upon a demonstration, to the
director's satisfaction, that the applicant:
(a) Earned a minimum of a bachelor's degree from a recognized edu-
cational institution in one of the following areas: biology, chemistry,
environmental sciences, geology, hydrogeology, toxicology, scientific
subdisciplines of public health or hazardous waste management, appro-
priate areas of engineering, or in a curriculum determined to be
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sons with an advanced degree or degrees in the specified
disciplines can become certified with fewer years of experi-
ence.237 The problem with these requirements is that hazardous
substance and petroleum cleanups may be complicated. They
can require more than a single professional in one of a number of
loosely related fields. For example, although a professional engi-
neer may be familiar with the technology for removing contami-
nants, he or she may not possess the knowledge or skills of
hydrogeology required to ensure that groundwater is protected
equivalent by the director. The charter or accreditation of the recog-
nized educational institution must have been effective as of the date
the applicant's degree(s) was granted;
(b) Possesses eight years of relevant professional experience, three of
which are supervisory or project management related;
(c) Possesses the professional competence and knowledge to perform the tasks
required of a certified professional. In order to make this determination, the
director will consider the following:
(i) The proficiency of the applicant;
(ii) The duration of the applicant's relevant employment;
(iii) The previous performance of the applicant with regard to various in-
vestigative methods used, including but not limited to, whether such experi-
ence includes work at sites where subsurface investigations have occurred;
(iv) The previous performance of the applicant with regard to the various
types of remedial systems designed and monitored;
(v) The performance of the applicant with regard to risk and exposure
assessments;
(vi) The number of individuals and disciplines of other professionals super-
vised or coordinated by the applicant;
(vii) The nature of conclusions reached and recommendations and opinions
presented by the applicant; and
(viii) Any other factors the director deems relevant;
This determination will be made by reviewing evidence including, but not lim-
ited to, references, agency comments, the application form and other sources
the director deems appropriate; and
(d) Possesses good moral character. Evidence of an inability to comply with the
ethical responsibilities required of a certified professional with good moral
character includes, but is not limited to, felonious acts and acts involving dis-
honesty, fraud, or deceit.
(3) An applicant who has earned advanced degrees from recognized educational
institutions in addition to those required to meet the minimum educational require-
ments may request that the director credit that additional education toward the re-
quirements for relevant professional experience if the applicant can demonstrate, to
the director's satisfaction, that the advanced degree(s) constitute relevant experi-
ence. Credit may be granted in accordance with the following:
(a) One year credit for each relevant master's degree; or
(b) Two years credit for a relevant doctorate degree.
(c) A maximum of two years credit may be granted for such additional
education.
237 Id.
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or remediated.23 s Similarly, a person with a master's degree in
toxicology understands the effects of human exposure to con-
taminants, but may know little about contaminant removal tech-
nologies.239 It is essential that the person or entity responsible
for overseeing site cleanup have all of the necessary skills and
knowledge, not just some of them. There is no provision within
Ohio's VAP that requires a certified professional to contract with
additional certified professionals, or other experts, to supplement
his or her knowledge as required by the specific circumstances
arising at a site.
One additional reason for questioning this privatized system is
that the federal government, specifically EPA, is nervous about
it. Evidence of EPA's anxiety lies in the fact that Ohio is the
only state in EPA Region 5 without a Memorandum of Agree-
ment (MOA) stating that Region 5 will defer to the state's judg-
ment with respect to sites remediated under a state program. 240
In states with an MOA, EPA has agreed not to pursue owners of
remediated sites when the state is satisfied with the cleanup, ex-
cept in the most extreme circumstances.241 This Article certainly
238 See Testimony of Landingham and Skelding, supra note 229.
239 See Testimony of Landingham and Skelding, supra note 229.
240 See BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at App. E-12.9
(Superfund Memorandum of Agreement Addendum No. 1 Between the Illinois En-
vironmental Protection Agency and the United States Environmental Protection
Agency, Region V); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at App. E-19
(Superfund Memorandum of Agreement Addendum (Between the Indiana Depart-
ment of Environmental Management and the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency Region V); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACnCE, supra note 7, at App.
E-25 (Superfund Memorandum of Agreement Addendum I [Between the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality and the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Region VI Brownfields Redevelopment); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND
PRACrICE, supra note 7, at App. E-27 (Superfund Memorandum of Agreement Ad-
dendum No. 1 Between the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and the United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Region V); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 7, at App. E-52 (Brownfields Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) Between the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and the United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Region V Concerning Brownfields
Properties and Voluntary Clean Ups). See also Brownfields Projects and Initiatives:
State Voluntary Cleanup Programs-Memoranda of Agreement (last visited Nov. 26,
2000) <http://www.epa.gov./swerosps/bf/gdc.htm#vc>.
241 See BROWNFIELDS LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 7, at App. E-52 (Brownfields
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Between the Wisconsin Department of Natu-
ral Resources and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region V, Concern-
ing Brownfields Properties and Voluntary Clean Ups, signed by U.S. EPA on
October 27, 1995).
Region V and Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR)
agree that unless exceptional circumstances exist--that is, the site poses an
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does not argue that merely because EPA Region 5 believes that a
program is problematic, it must be so. Rather, Region 5's con-
cern is merely a further indication that Ohio's program raises
concerns. Interestingly, Ohio currently is pursuing what amounts
to another innovation in law, a dual-tracked voluntary cleanup
program in which sites cleaned up under an alternative "MOA
track" '242 would be eligible for certain federal protections under a
not yet agreed upon MOA with Region 5.243
Although Ohio was an early proponent of using private parties
for site remediation and oversight, Ohio is not the only state with
an assessment and remediation program not directly overseen by
imminent threat to public health or the environment or in an emergency
situation--Region V will not plan and does not anticipate any federal ac-
tion under the Superfund law in the following situations:
When an environmental assessment, a site investigation or both are con-
ducted in accordance with WDNR guidance and the NR 700 rule series,
and the WDNR issues a no action letter.
When an investigation is conducted in accordance with WDNR guidance
and the NR 700 rule series, and the WDNR issues an off-site source
letter.
When a property in Wisconsin has been investigated and remediated in
accordance with the NR 700 rule series.
When a property has been investigated and cleaned up in accordance
with the NR 700 rule series and has received a certificate of completion
(per s. 144.765, Stats).
These operating principles do not apply to sites that have been listed on
the National Priorities List, or to sites subject to an order or other en-
forcement action under Superfund law, or to sites imminently threaten-
ing public health or the environment.
BROWNFIELDS LAW & PRACrICE, supra note 7, at App. E-52.
242 If this Agreement is acceptable to EPA, the MOA Track would be available to
volunteer remediators who desire increased comfort with respect to federal liability,
specifically to EPA Region 5. Participants who choose the MOA Track, rather than
the "Classic VAP" track, will be required to follow existing procedures applicable to
VAP sites, and to conduct several additional steps. According to Ohio EPA's MOA
application, the MOA Track would require "more agency involvement, such as no-
tice of entry into the program, approval of certain documents and work plans and
greater public involvement." BROWNFIELDS LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 7, at
App. E-52. MOA Track sites would also be subject to increased administrative re-
view in exchange for comfort from federal liability under the MOA, in addition to
the Ohio EPA-issued Covenant Not to Sue. BROWNFIELDS LAW & PRAC-ICE, supra
note 7, at App. E-52.
243 See Ohio EPA's Proposed Final Memorandum of Agreement Application to
U.S. EPA Region 5. The application, a request by Ohio EPA to enter into an MOA
with Region 5, explains how Ohio EPA's suggested "MOA Track" would comply
with EPA's Six Baseline Criteria for Voluntary Action Programs. Id. (available at
<http://www.epa.state.oh.us/derr/vap/moa/0011701ohiomoa.pdf> (last visited April
27, 2001)).
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the state environmental protection agency.244 As described be-
low, in some other states the involvement of private parties, cou-
pled with statutorily mandated state oversight by the state
environmental agency, has produced what appear to be much
better programs. In these states, with some of the problems
raised by privatization reduced or eliminated, the benefits of
such a system remain.
Like Ohio, Colorado's brownfields law requires participants to
use a "qualified professional" to prepare a Voluntary Cleanup
Plan, which includes an Environmental Site Assessment
(ESA).245 Unlike Ohio law, which requires that certified profes-
sionals be licensed by the state EPA, the qualified professional
under Colorado law is merely "a person with education, training
and experience in preparing environmental studies and assess-
ments. 246 The ESA,247 prepared by a qualified professional
244 See generally BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7.
245 A voluntary cleanup plan includes: a) An Environmental Assessment of the
property which describes the contamination and the risk currently posed by the con-
tamination to the public health and the environment (see definition of and criteria
for a complete environmental assessment); b) A proposal to remediate any contami-
nation that poses an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment, taking
into consideration the present and any differing proposed future use of the property
and setting forth a timetable for implementation and for post-cleanup monitoring; c)
A description of applicable state cleanup standards for soils, surface and ground
water, and for constituents for which no state standard exists, and a description of
proposed cleanup levels and any risk to human health or the environment posed by
the current or proposed future use of the site. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-
304(2) (West 2000).
246 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-308(1) (West 1994). Colorado requires the
environmental professionals to have a minimum of five years relevant experience
and states that the volunteer must submit the environmental professional's docu-
mentation in the form of a statement of qualifications or resume when the Environ-
mental Assessment is submitted. THE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND WASTE
MANAGEMENT DIVISION, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVI-
RONMENT, VOLUNTARY CLEANUP ROADMAP: A How-To GUIDE, Appendix 3
(1997).
247 In Colorado, an Environmental Assessment must include:
a) legal description and a map of the property;
b) physical characteristics of the site and contiguous areas, including the
location of any surface water bodies and groundwater aquifers;
c) location of any wells located on the site or within a one-half mile radius
and a description of the use of the wells;
d) current and proposed use of onsite groundwater;
e) operational history of the site (at least past 50 years) and the current use
of contiguous areas;
f) present and proposed use of the site;
g) information concerning the nature and extent of any contamination at
the site, including the impact from any release on contiguous properties;
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hired by the program participant, is part of a package submitted
to the state agency, which also includes a remediation plan pro-
posal and remedial alternatives. If no remediation is necessary, a
No Action Petition should be submitted instead of a remediation
plan. Even if the participant is submitting a No Action Petition,
that petition must still be accompanied by an ESA.248
In Colorado, the Voluntary Cleanup Plan must be approved by
the state agency prior to cleanup.249 Additionally, after cleanup
the program participant must submit a certification of approval
in order to qualify for protection from liability. According to
some, the Colorado state agency's review of the Cleanup Plan or
No Action petition is primarily a paper chase, although the Vol-
untary Cleanup and Redevelopment Act does authorize the
agency to enter the property to evaluate a request for a release
from liability.250 The state agency must review the Voluntary
Cleanup Plan or No Action Petition and issue a written determi-
nation within forty-five days, otherwise the plan is deemed ap-
proved. 51 If the agency denies a plan, it must provide specific
reasons for that denial.2 52 The approved plan must be initiated
within twelve months and completed within twenty-four months
after its approval.253 Like in Ohio, the property owner in Colo-
rado must provide the state agency with a certification from a
qualified environmental professional indicating that the ap-
proved. cleanup plan has been fully implemented.254 In Colo-
rado, like Ohio, the state relies on the private professional to
insure that applicable cleanup standards have been met. How-
h) any sampling results or the data characterizing the soils, groundwater or
surface water (prepared by an environmental professional with at least 5
years relevant experience and should include a minimum number of soil
and groundwater samples using CDPHE's preferred analytical methods);
i) description of human and environmental exposure to the contaminants,
based on the property's current and future proposed use.
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-308(2) (West 2000). See generally HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS AND WASTE MANAGEMENT DIVISION, CDPHE, VOLUNTARY CLEANUP
ROADMAP: A How-To GUIDE (1997) (available at <http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/
hm/vcradoc.pdf>).
248 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-307(2)(a) (West 2000).
2 49 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACICE, supra note 7, at § Co. 01[21[a] (citing COL-
ORADO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, VOLUNTARY
CLEANUP ROADMAP, App. 3 at 8).2 50 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(5) (West 2000).
251 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-306(1)(a)-25-16-307(1).
252 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-306(1)(c).
253 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-306(4)(a).
254 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-306(5)(a).
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ever, unlike Ohio, in Colorado, the state must first approve the
cleanup plan upon which the environmental professional will act.
It also appears that in Colorado, the state, not the private profes-
sional, determines whether to issue a "No Action" letter.2 Be-
cause the state is quite clearly making the decision regarding
adequate completion of the cleanup, one problem with Ohio's
program is removed in Colorado.
Under Massachusetts' Hazardous Waste Site Cleanup Profes-
sional program, private environmental consultants, called "Li-
censed Site Professionals" (LSPs) control much of the state's
mandatory cleanup efforts for lesser contaminated sites. 6 In
fact, LSPs effectively control cleanup efforts at all sites not di-
rectly under the control of the state Department of Environmen-
tal Protection (DEP).2 57  LSPs, who are hired by program
participants, not by the state, must pass a licensing exam for
which the state determines the necessary qualifications by statute
and DEP regulation 8.2 5  LSPs are authorized to give "opinions"
at various stages of the cleanup. 259 An LSP opinion serves as
DEP approval of the work completed. 26 ° LSPs decide whether a
permit is required at a site, sign the permit, and determine
whether cleanup was carried out satisfactorily under DEP regula-
tions.261 Aside from DEP audits of twenty percent of LSP super-
vised sites annually, LSP "opinions" are the final decision
regarding LSP supervised sites.262
In Massachusetts, the state has sole discretion to enter into a
brownfields Covenant Not to Sue with a current or prospective
owner or operator of the more contaminated sites-that is, sites
that do not qualify for LSP supervision. It may do so, however,
only where three requirements are met:
255 See Sweeney, supra note 204, at 137-38.
256 See Eisen, supra note 9, at 1033. See also Peter K. Johnson, Mr. Smith Goes to
Washington: 1997 Superfund Amendments, Will it Solve the Liability Problem and
How Will This Affect Massachusetts?, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1269, 1288-1289 (1997).
257 See Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to Save Greenfields: Shifting the
Environmental Risks of Acquiring and Revising Contaminated Land, 27 CONN. L.
REV. 789, 804 (1995).
258 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 804; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21A, § 19-20
(West 1998); MASS. REGS. CODE. tit. 309, §§ 1.00-8.00 (2000).
259 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 804.
260 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 804.
261 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 804.
262 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 804.
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(1) In order to enter into a Covenant Not to Sue, the Com-
monwealth must determine that: the proposed redevelop-
ment or reuse of the property will contribute to the
economic or physical revitalization of the community in
which it is located, and provides one or more of the follow-
ing public benefits: a) provides new, permanent jobs, or b)
results in affordable housing benefits, or c) provides his-
toric preservation, or d) creates or revitalizes open space,
or e) will provide some other public benefit to the commu-
nity as determined by the attorney general. 63
(2) A permanent solution or remedy operation status is
achieved and maintained, or where the eligible person
demonstrates that a permanent solution is not feasible, a
temporary solution is achieved and maintained 6;2 4 and
(3) A development plan describing the proposed use or reuse
of the site and the proposed public benefits is submitted in
accordance with regulations promulgated under the
Brownfields Act. 65
Like in Ohio, the Massachusetts DEP exercises control over
the LSPs through annual audits of approximately twenty percent
of the sites.26 6 The Massachusetts program, at least in terms of
the role of LSPs, is similar to that in Ohio. Because an LSP opin-
ion serves as DEP approval of completion, the program poses
some of the same troubling problems as Ohio's program. How-
ever, Massachusetts departs from Ohio in one important aspect:
LSPs in Massachusetts only have approval authority over the
least contaminated sites, thus reducing the environmental threat
caused by their mistakes.
In Connecticut, licensed environmental professionals (LEPs)
must pass an examination and obtain a license from the state.
Under the Connecticut Transfer of Hazardous Waste Establish-
ment Act (Transfer Act), however, the Connecticut DEP hires
environmental consultants without any statutory restrictions im-
posed on its choice. 67 Once licensed and hired by DEP, these
263 See Seth D. Jaffe, Massachusetts Brownfields Legislation: A Description and
Analysis, 42 BOSTON B. J. 19 (1998); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 3A
(j)(3)(a)(i) (West 2000).
264 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 21E, § 3A (j)(3)(a)(ii).
265 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21E, § 3A (j)(3)(a)(iii).
266 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 804.
267 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 806. See supra section IV.A. regarding Ohio's
use of certified private environmental professionals in its brownfields program.
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LEPs are authorized to ascertain the eligibility of specific parcels
of land for voluntary cleanup and cleanup incentives. They may
also determine the cleanup standards applicable to a site as well
as the required level of cleanup.268 Although these professionals
have significant decision-making responsibility, because they are
hired by the state itself, rather than the program participant, the
state retains substantial control over their actions.
The Connecticut Transfer Act requires that "any time parties
transfer 'operations' of an 'establishment' which involves hazard-
ous waste, they must file a 'negative declaration' as to the envi-
ronmental status of the site with the Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP).' ' 26 9 However, the DEP can-
not block the transfer of a site and the statute merely serves "to
alert the DEP to the location of contaminated land. '2 0 This is a
fairly unique notification procedure which, although it notifies
the agency with respect to the location of contaminated land,
does nothing to encourage its cleanup.
A major problem with the Transfer Act is that the DEP is sig-
nificantly "backlogged. 2 7 1 Consequently, "[t]he owner of a
Transfer Act site has two options: to either wait for the DEP to
approve a proposed clean-up, or to proceed without DEP ap-
proval and take the risk that the clean-up undertaken may have
to be redone when the DEP finally completes its review. "272
Thus, in 1994, the Connecticut legislature authorized the DEP to
retain consultants for an expedited review process at the appli-
cant's expense. In contrast to the Ohio program, the Connecticut
DEP hires the consultants without statutory restrictions on its
choice.273 Furthermore, the statute only authorizes consultants
to conduct reviews in certain situations that may serve as impedi-
ments to expediency.274
Some other states employing some variation of a privatization
model include Arizona, whose program is similar to Ohio's,2 75
268 See Barton, supra note 220, at 15A.
269 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 793.
270 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 793.
271 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 802.
272 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 803.
273 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 806. See supra section IV.A. regarding Ohio's
use of certified private environmental professionals in its brownfields program.
274 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 806.
275 See BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRAcIcE, supra note 7, at AZ chapter. See also
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-154 et. seq. (West 2000).
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and Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Maine and Missouri. In those
states qualified, certified or licensed environmental professionals
perform environmental assessments and prepare cleanup plans,
but the state has ultimate approval authority over a site's
cleanup.276 Some states, like Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi
and Montana, allow environmental consultants and engineers to
participate in assessments and cleanups with no certification or
licensing requirements.277 These states, however, do not allow
the private professionals to make decisions regarding the satis-
faction of cleanup requirements. Some states, like Massachusetts,
allow licensed professionals to oversee and certify cleanups of
less contaminated sites.2 78 In Utah, although the state does not
require voluntary cleanup participants to use certified or licensed
professionals, some Utah statutes require certification of persons
who perform certain tasks such as soil testing and underground
storage tank installation.279 All of these states' efforts to transfer
tasks from the responsible government agency to private parties,
whether or not the responsible agency licenses them, are forms of
privatization or public/private partnership, and exhibit various
degrees of problems and benefits.
B. Lessons on Privatization from Other
Areas of Government
In addition to its recent entr6e into environmental law, priva-
tization has reached traditional government functions with
broader public policy implications than, for example, the out-
sourcing of data processing operations, public transportation
management, and waste removal. This Article focuses on areas
outside the environmental area because, although there are lim-
276 See BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at CO chapter. See also
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 25-16-308(1); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7,
at DE chapter; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9108(a); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRAC-
TICE, supra note 7, at MO-8, § MO.01[3][iii]; BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 7, at TX-18, § TX.05[7].
277 See BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at MD chapter,
§ MD.05[5]; BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at MN-29,
§ MN.04[5]. See also MINN. R. 7105 (2000); BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 7, at MS-32, § MS.06[5][a]; BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra
note 7, at MT-4, § MT.01[1].
278 See BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at MA-11, § MA.05[2];
see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21A (2000).
279 See BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at UT-14, § UT.05[4];
UTAH ADMIN. CODE 311-201-2(a) (2001).
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ited uses of the private sector in environmental regulation,28 0
other areas of government are far more sophisticated in this
regard.
An example of privatization with broad public policy implica-
tions is privatization in the criminal justice system. Although
their uses of privatization are different in important ways, priva-
tization in corrections and in brownfields programs raise similar
concerns. In both instances private entities have decision-making
power over citizens. In addition to the more controversial area
of privatized corrections, where private individuals make impor-
tant decisions with respect to citizens' liberty, this Article briefly
explores the use of private parties in the more mundane area of
state vehicle safety inspections. Although there are certainly im-
portant distinctions, state authorized motor vehicle inspectors
are similar to private environmental professionals in state
brownfields programs because they apply numerically specific,
state-mandated standards and regulations.
Whereas privatization in state brownfields programs is a new
idea, privatization in these other areas of traditional government
function has existed for quite a long time. Lessons learned from
privatization in these other areas can inform states' uses of priva-
tization in brownfield cleanup programs.
1. Privatization in Corrections: Outsourcing Agency Decision-
Making Responsibility
Governments have long outsourced basic prison services such
as food preparation, medical care and educational services. A
less common, but growing form of privatization in corrections is
the use of privately run, for-profit, major correctional facilities.2 81
When control of a correctional facility is in private hands, private
parties make decisions regarding personal freedoms, such as the
denial of privileges or placement in solitary confinement. 282 Al-
though not concerning so fundamental an issue as personal free-
280 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
281 See Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U.
L. REV. 531, 540-41 (1989). See also Brian B. Evans, Private Prisons, 36 EMORY L.J.
253, 254 (1987); David Yarden, Prisons, Profit, and the Private Sector Solution, 21
AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 326 (1994).
282 See Joel, supra note 218, at 59. See also Evans, supra note 281; Field, supra
note 166; David Yarden, Prisons, Profits and the Private Sector Solution, 21 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 325 (1994) (reviewing PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Gary
W. Bowman et al. eds., 1993)).
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dom, state brownfields programs that use private professionals
are similar, in a small way, to privatized correctional facilities be-
cause private parties are making decisions, effectively on behalf
of the state, regarding cleanup sufficiency. Based on the deci-
sions of private parties, some state agencies take the major step
of absolving site owners of liability with respect to environmental
contamination at the site.
Criticism of the use of private correctional facilities revolves
around a fundamental debate over government's role in Ameri-
can society. The claim is that "[p]rison privatization represents
the government's abdication of one of its most basic responsibili-
ties to its people,' 2 83 that is, enforcement of criminal laws.2 84
While not pertaining to anything so fundamental as the depriva-
tion of personal liberty, a similar criticism applies to the use of
private party decision-makers in some state brownfields pro-
grams. That is, it is the government's responsibility to enforce
environmental laws, thereby protecting its citizens from environ-
mental harm. It follows that allowing private individuals to deter-
mine when a contaminated site is clean enough to erase the
owner's liability to the state is an abdication of agencies' respon-
sibility to the public for enforcement of the environmental laws.
The obvious retort to that argument is that in using private
parties to perform evaluative tasks traditionally performed by
state agencies, as Ohio's program requires, the agency is merely
carrying out its responsibilities by delegating tasks to private en-
tities.285 This method could actually be cost-efficient and not
lead to sub-par cleanups because of the expertise and integrity of
private professionals, and because the state EPA must audit a
percentage of the work carried out by private entities.286
283 See Field, supra note 166, at 668.
284 See PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 148-149.
285 See PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 149.
286 To date, Ohio EPA appears to have carried out its audit requirements. See
Electronic mail from Mike Allen to Jennifer Lukas Jackson, supra note 216. Be-
tween 1996 and 1999, Ohio EPA audited twenty-seven sites from among the ninety
NFA letters it received, or approximately thirty percent of the total. This informa-
tion, however, is difficult to obtain. Although information regarding the numbers of
NFA letters filed and Covenants Not to Sue issued is available on Ohio EPA's web
site, the numbers of audits, which sites have been audited, and the percentages of
sites audited from the total pool of NFA letters received is not available. Further,
there is no information available about the adequacy of the audits or the success or
failure of sites that have been through the audit process. Without this information, it
is difficult to determine whether the use of certified environmental professionals has
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Further, private prisons exist to make a profit. In fact, their
business has grown at a rate of thirty-five percent annually.287
Because of this drive for profit, some argue that the state should
not allow a private entity to regulate a citizen's freedom because
a private entity's motives are not pure. Because of a desire for
profit, private entities may discourage alternatives to incarcera-
tion (i.e. probation, parole, and community-based corrections) in
an effort to keep their prisons full and their profits flowing.288
Just as the injection of a profit incentive into the corrections sys-
tem fuels fears of improper motivation in the decisions of private
parties, the injection of profit into the environmental assessments
on which agencies rely leads to the same potential problem. An
incentive to prolong cleanups might exist because the private
parties are paid for their work, and because landowners cannot
go elsewhere for a No Further Action letter without beginning
the process anew with a different certified professional. How-
ever, the landowner who hires a certified professional could ad-
dress this problem by structuring the contract under which the
certified professional works to pay by the job, rather than the
time spent.
Alternatively, private parties seeking to corner volume in the
market for No Further Action letters may not be sufficiently dili-
gent with respect to the quality of the cleanup, instead seeking to
please their customers and issue quick NFA letters. The growth
of the private prison industry has created an incentive for certain
groups to lobby for more private prisons, more incarceration,
and more crimes and punishment. Of course, with private parties
making decisions regarding brownfield cleanups, one might ex-
pect similar lobbies to emerge in favor of more numerous and
stringent environmental regulations. Either way, although pri-
vate participation and profit are not necessarily inimical to the
public interest, the profit incentive can cloud private parties'
been effective in carrying out agency tasks, or whether it has led to too many inade-
quately remediated sites.
287 See Larry Abramson, Growth of Private Prisons, NPR's Larry Abramson Re-
ports on the Growth of Private Prisons, which Promise to Save Money by Running
Corrections Like a Business, MORNING EDrrION (May 28, 1998) (available at <http://
search.npr.org/cf/cmn/cmnpsosfm.cfm?SeglD+25932>). A leading private prison
company, Community Corrections Corporation, reportedly made $2.6 million in the
first quarter of 1998; CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., May 18, 1998, at 22.
288 See Field, supra note 166, at 671.
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judgment in carrying out what would otherwise be a government
function.
Another problem that critics have raised with respect to the
drive for profit is that private parties who run prison facilities
may cut corners such that the quality of services declines, putting
prisoners' health and safety at risk.289 Similarly, in the case of
private decision-makers in brownfields programs, certified pro-
fessionals who cut corners may put the environmental condition
of the site and the health of third parties at risk. With both envi-
ronmental assessment and privatized corrections, this problem
might be avoided through regulation with satisfactory monitoring
and oversight provisions.2" Whereas with prisons, the threat of
civil rights lawsuits might help prevent "substandard levels" of
prison services,2 9 1 with environmental assessment, the threat of
third party liability might encourage landowners to ensure
proper cleanup.
Another potential problem with the privatization of prisons is
that it involves the delegation of decision-making responsibility
to politically unaccountable parties.292 However, private prisons
are at least somewhat accountable to the public because all gov-
ernment contracts require contractors to adhere to government
standards. 293 Additionally, with respect to private prisons, most
289 See Field, supra note 166, at 663. Opponents argue that private facilities will
hire fewer guards, resulting in increased danger to inmates. The non-unionized na-
ture of a private facility will result in lower paid employees, and therefore, will lead
to the hiring of lower "caliber" employees; a decrease in educational, medical and
food services may also result.
290 See Evans, supra note 281, at 281.
291 See Evans, supra note 281, at 282. Even more troubling is the concern for
prisoners' constitutional protections and the constitutionality of private prisons gen-
erally. The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently considered the constitutionality of
private prisons, holding that the privatized county jail at issue was legal. See Tulsa
County Deputy Sheriff's Fraternal Order of Police v. Bd. Of County Commissioners
of Tulsa County, 995 P.2d 1124 (Okla. 2000). Further, there is debate in the litera-
ture regarding whether actions by private prison officials are "state actions." Harold
J. Sullivan, Privatization of Corrections: A Threat to Prisoners' Rights, in PRIVATIZ-
ING CORRECTIONAL INsTITTIONS 139 (1993). To date, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court has heard only one case on private prisons, holding that their employees are
not entitled to the same qualified immunity as would apply to government prison
employees. Id. at 145; Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997)(relying on Wy-
att v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992), the Court reasoned that the purpose of immunity
protection for government employees was to protect the government's ability to per-
form its traditional functions, and this purpose did not apply to private enterprises).
292 See Field, supra note 166, at 651.
293 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 744 (West 1999), which authorizes private
operation of county prisons provided that "service shall meet any standards pre-
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contracts bind prison companies to the rules promulgated by the
American Correctional Association, the field's primary profes-
sional association. 29
4
With respect to privatization in corrections, the report of Presi-
dent Reagan's Commission on Privatization concluded:
"[C]ontracting out the administration of jails, and prisons, at the
federal, state, and local levels could lead to improved, more effi-
cient operation. ' 295 Although the report acknowledges that is-
sues of liability and accountability exist, it does not find them
insurmountable obstacles to contracting out the administration
of these facilities.296 Specifically, the report acknowledges that
policymaking and legislative or judicial functions cannot be con-
tracted out.297 It concludes, however, that because privately op-
erated prisons remain bound by regulation and ultimate
supervisory authority of the government, government does not,
in contracting with private prison companies, abdicate its author-
ity inappropriately.298 Instead, government appropriately dele-
gates some of its executive or administrative responsibilities.299
Although certainly only the state has the right to incarcerate citi-
zens, it is not the case that only the state can run a prison facility
in a humane, fair, and efficient way.
Although the question of how well privatization has worked in
corrections is a matter of substantial debate, there have been sev-
scribed and established for county jails, including but not limited to standards con-
cerning internal and perimeter security, discipline of inmates, employment of
inmates, and proper food, clothing, housing, and medical care"; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 34-105 (West 1999), requiring the same of private prisons in cities and municipali-
ties. Additionally, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 § 68 (West 1999) provides that "any
state law governing jails shall apply to jail facilities operated by a private prison
contractor"; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.06 (Anderson 1999) (governing contracts
for private operation and management of correctional facilities) and OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.07 (Anderson 1999) (governing entities authorized to operate cor-
rectional facility housing out-of-state prisoners and requirements for operation).
2 94 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185.
295 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at xviii.
2 96 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at xviii. See also Savas,
supra note 184, at 897-99.
297 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 149. See also U.S.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-120, GUIDELINES FOR THE
USE OF ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE SERVICES, (Jan. 1, 1988), rescinded in Recission
of OMB Circular A-120, Guidelines for the use of Advisory and Assistance Services,
58 Fed. Reg. 63,593 (1993); Jonathan Boston, Inherently Governmental Functions
and the Limits to Contracting Out, in THE STATE UNDER CONTRACT 78, 88-89
(Jonathan Boston ed., 1995).
2 98 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 149.
2 99 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 149.
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eral recent attempts to enact state legislation to regulate or even
ban privatization of prisons.3 ° ° For example, on June 16, 1998,
the California Senate killed a bill to ban private state prisons.
The bill had proposed an amendment to California's constitution
to stop privatization of any public safety service, including fire,
police and corrections.30'
That said, there are lessons we can learn from privatized cor-
rections that apply to privatization elsewhere, even to the use of
private parties to make important decisions in brownfields rede-
velopment programs. Just as inadequately regulated private pris-
ons are unsafe without ample oversight, privatization of
environmental cleanups may lead to dangers to human health
and the environment.
In particular, there is a risk to the environment and human
health when certified professionals are only required to be well
qualified, as in Ohio's program, in some of the areas of expertise
necessary to execute a cleanup of a particular site.30 2 Because of
their diversity of skills, environmental consulting firms, which
have engineers, toxicologists, geologists, hydrogeologists and col-
lective experience with numerous types of hazardous substance
cleanups, are more appropriate than any individual to be "certi-
fied professionals."30 3 Further, the state EPA could retain envi-
ronmental consulting firms rather than requiring regulated
parties to contract directly with private individuals who will then
have an economic interest in the cleanup.3
The remaining benefit of using private parties to make deci-
sions regarding the sufficiency of cleanup is the alleged expertise
of private environmental professionals. In addition, this process
reduces costs by reducing administrative burdens on agencies.30 5
300 The Ohio House of Representatives introduced HR842 (122nd Ohio Gen. As-
sembly, 1998) to eliminate private prisons, however, the bill died in Ohio Senate
committee. The Missouri House of Representatives considered a bill forbidding
privatization of prisons. Mo. H.B. 1857 (89th Gen. Assembly, 1998). This bill also
died in committee. See HB 1857 (visited Apr. 1, 2001) <http://www.house.state.mo.
usfbills98/bills98/HB1857.htm>.
301 See Andy Furillo, The Effort to Block Private Prisons Dies in Senate, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE, June 17, 1998. See also Mike Lewis, Bill Banning Private Pris-
ons Fails, THE FRESNO BEE, June 17, 1998, at B3.
302 See discussion supra at notes 235-239 and accompanying text.
303 See Testimony of Landingham and Skelding, supra note 229.
304 See Testimony of Landingham and Skelding, supra note 229.
305 See Michael C. Powell, Controversial Elements of Brownfields Legislation, 8
MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 8 (1997).
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Although it is too early with most state brownfields programs
to judge them too harshly, what we learn from the criticisms of
privatized corrections is that there are dangers involved in priva-
tization, especially when the privatization allows private parties
to make decisions on which government agencies rely or are ef-
fectively bound. Privatization may well produce the stated bene-
fits of cost savings and expertise. It may also allow end results to
be clouded or diminished, perhaps in a dangerous way, due to
the inherent profit motivation. If brownfields programs capital-
ize on the benefit of privatization, but reduce the negative as-
pects of that innovation, states will have safe and efficient
programs. Massachusetts, with sufficient agency oversight of pri-
vate environmental consultants is a good example. Ohio, which
abrogates considerable responsibility to private parties, is not.
2. State Motor Vehicle Safety Inspections: Oversight in Public-
Private Partnerships
When a state requires that motor vehicle safety inspections be
carried out by private parties, it is not the kind of abdication of
decision-making authority one sees with private prisons. It does,
however, present some useful parallels to the use of private par-
ties in state brownfields programs, such as Ohio's VAP. In par-
ticular, states' uses of private parties in motor vehicle safety
inspection programs illustrate how private parties can safely and
effectively carry out the state's work, while under the specific
oversight of state agencies. The motor vehicle safety inspection
programs in Maryland and New York, now time-honored tradi-
tions, are useful examples with which to compare the use of pri-
vate parties in state brownfields programs, like Ohio's VAP and
others.
The State of Maryland requires that new owners of motor ve-
hicles submit their vehicles to a safety inspection 30 6 by a licensed
inspection station30 7 when used vehicles are transferred.30 8
When a person transfers a used vehicle, the transferor must ob-
306 "Vehicle" includes passenger, multipurpose, vanpool, truck, tractor, trailer,
for-hire vehicles, and motorcycles; MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-101(i) (1999), "ve-
hicle" does not include any historic vehicle or any trailer which is a mobile home as
defined by MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 11-134. MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-
101(i)(3).
307 MD CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-101(f). An inspection station is a facility that is
licensed by the Automotive Safety Enforcement Division of the Department of
State Police under this subtitle.
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tain an inspection certificate 30 9 from a state-licensed inspection
station.310 An inspection certificate is a written certification by a
licensed inspection station certifying that the vehicle meets or ex-
ceeds the applicable safety standards. 31 ' A state-registered indi-
vidual who personally inspected the vehicle signs and dates the
certificate on behalf of the inspection station.312 The inspection
station issues the inspection certificate and attaches it to the vehi-
cle.313 Maryland law requires an inspection certificate before the
Motor Vehicle Administration may title or register the used
vehicle.314
Although Maryland uses private automobile dealerships and
repair shops to conduct these statutorily mandated safety inspec-
tions, the Maryland statute requires licensing both of the facili-
ties and the mechanics that conduct the vehicle inspections. To
obtain an Inspection Station license, the facility must apply to the
Automotive Safety Enforcement Division of the Department of
State Police (Division).315 The Division inspects the applicant fa-
cility with respect to its ability to inspect for and correct vehicle
safety issues, and, if the facility is qualified, the Department of
State Police issues the facility an Inspection Station license.316
The facility must renew its application annually.31 7
Additionally, a mechanic who intends to conduct inspections
and issue inspection certificates and repair order certifications
318
30 8 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-106(b)(2). However there are exemptions to the
inspection requirement. See generally MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-106(a). Some
examples of exemptions include any transfer of a used vehicle between licensed
dealers, transfers between spouses, transfers between a parent and child, or co-own-
ers of the vehicle when a co-owner's name is being removed from the title, and
transfers of vehicles between state agencies.
30 9 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-101(e).
3 10 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-106(b)(2).
311 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-101(h).
312 Id.
313 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-106(b)(2).
314 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-107(a)(1).
315 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-103(a).
316 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-103(a)(i) & (ii).
317 Id.
318 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-101(h). A repair order certification is a written
certification by an inspection station or police department that certifies that:
as of its date, the equipment specified in a safety equipment repair order
meets or exceeds the standards established under this subtitle; and is signed
and dated on behalf of the inspection station by the registered individual
who personally inspected the vehicle; or on behalf of the police department
by the authorized police officer who personally inspected the vehicle.
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must first submit an application and take an examination admin-
istered by the Division.319 Based upon pre-determined standards,
the Division determines whether the applicant is qualified, and
then registers and licenses the mechanic to conduct vehicle
inspections.32 °
Like Ohio's VAP, Maryland's motor vehicle safety inspection
program provides for private individuals to carry out certain
tasks that fall within the state's responsibility to protect public
health and welfare. Both programs require the private actors to
submit to an application process through the state agency. How-
ever, a critical distinction between the two programs is that the
Maryland motor vehicle safety inspection program allows for a
more significant opportunity for state oversight than is present in
Ohio's VAP. First, in Maryland's vehicle safety inspection pro-
gram, the individual mechanic who applies to the Division for a
license must take an examination to determine whether his or
her skills meet the regulatory requirements. 321
The Ohio EPA, although it requires a lengthy written applica-
tion, requires no examination prior to granting an individual sta-
tus as a certified professional. Second, in Maryland, the
Inspection Station, in addition to the individual mechanic, must
apply to the Division for a license. There is no provision in
Ohio's VAP requiring a license or certification for the firm or
group in which the certified professional works, assuming that
the certified professional is not working alone. Finally, while cer-
tified professionals must be proficient in any one of a number of
areas of scientific expertise but need not be competent in all ar-
eas, vehicle safety inspectors must be competent in all areas of
safety inspection, admittedly a narrower, less technical scope.
Although an examination process itself certainly does not ensure
competence, drivers' license and bar examinations would dis-
prove that assumption, it does give the state an opportunity to
exert control and authority over the process.
In addition, under the Maryland vehicle safety inspection pro-
gram, prior to licensing the state agency inspects the applicant
facility to determine whether it can properly inspect and repair
vehicles. Although the Ohio VAP does require laboratories to
be certified if their services are used by the certified professionals
3 19 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-103.1(a).
3 20 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23- 103.1(a) & (b).
321 MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-103.1(b).
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in the course of VAP cleanup, this is distinguishable from the
level of oversight available in Maryland's motor vehicle inspec-
tion program. This distinction exists because the inspection sta-
tion where the licensed mechanic works must be the same facility
where the inspection took place and where all required repairs
have been completed.322 Under the VAP, however, the certified
laboratories that test samples collected at a cleanup site might
work on only one piece of the cleanup at a site. There may be
many other parts of the cleanup done solely by the certified pro-
fessional, whom the law does not compel to use other certified
professionals to supplement his or her work or that done by the
certified laboratory.
Similar to Maryland's program, New York's motor vehicle in-
spection statute contains many of the same procedures and re-
quirements for vehicle inspections at the time of transfer. 323 In
New York, the Commissioner 32 4 licenses private individuals as
certified motor vehicle safety inspectors.32 5 Applicants must
meet established standards of competency to receive a
certificate.326
New York's motor vehicle inspection program is similar to Ma-
ryland's in important ways. In New York, the Commissioner in-
vestigates the facility to determine that it is properly equipped
and has competent personnel to inspect vehicles, that inspections
will be properly conducted, and that the applicant facility com-
plies with applicable statutes and regulations.32 7 Additionally, the
state may suspend or revoke the facility's license with cause and
notice to the licensee.328
Once a certified inspector inspects a vehicle, the official in-
spection station issues a certificate of inspection for that vehicle
322 Inspection certificates must be "signed and dated ... on behalf of the inspec-
tion station by the registered individual who personally inspected the vehicle ..
MD. CODE ANN., TRANS § 23-10(e)(2).
323 See generally N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 301 (McKinney 2000). See especially
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 301(c)(1)(a) (McKinney 1996), which requires, inter alia,
a safety inspection of the brakes, steering mechanism, wheel alignment, light sys-
tems, and safety restraint systems, and an inspection of the vehicle identification
number.
324 Commissioner of the New York Department of Motor Vehicles, N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1996).
325 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 304-a(a) (McKinney 1996).
326 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 304-a(c) (McKinney 1996).
327 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 303(a)(1) (McKinney 1996).
328 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 303(e), (f) (McKinney 1996).
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indicating that the mechanisms and other equipment of that vehi-
cle are in proper and safe condition and comply with all applica-
ble laws.3 29 The Commissioner inspects all official inspection
stations33° and has the power to inspect any motor vehicle lo-
cated on the premises of an official inspection station that has
been issued a certificate of inspection within the previous fifteen
days.33 ' This oversight measure, which helps to ensure the quality
and validity of the inspections, is not required by Maryland's ve-
hicle inspection statute. Importantly, the qualitative oversight af-
forded by the New York statute's inspection requirement is
notably absent from Ohio's brownfields program. Although
Ohio's brownfields program does require that certified profes-
sionals renew their certification annually, the statute requires no
on-site inspection of work quality or equipment other than the
mandated audits of approximately twenty-five percent of sites
that have already been issued a Covenant Not to Sue.
3. What Brownfields Programs Can Learn from Privatization
in Other Areas of Government
Limited privatization has long been an accepted practice of the
public sector. According to a federal government report:
"Where similar functions are readily available in the private sec-
tor, and where services show [a] genuine likelihood of being im-
proved by private providers, long-standing, bipartisan national
policy supports transferring the functions to the private sec-
tor." '3 3 2 Although privatization exists and functions well in many
areas of government service and responsibility, in other areas,
like environmental law, use of private entities to perform tradi-
tional government functions is a recent innovation. The most im-
portant questions regarding privatization in environmental
cleanup are what extent of decision-making authority the private
party holds, and overall, whether the benefits of the program
outweigh its risks.
Although privatization concepts are employed in governmen-
tal operations in numerous areas of government, to various de-
grees of success, we learn some lessons from those other areas of
government operations which can inform the use of the private
329 N.Y. VEH. & TRa'. LAW § 304(a) (McKinney 1996).
330 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 303(d)(1) (McKinney 1996).
331 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 303(d)(2) (McKinney 1996).
332 PRIVATIZATION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 185, at 155.
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sector in brownfields redevelopment programs. For example,
from privatization of correctional operations we learn that there
are dangers in allowing private parties to assume too much con-
trol of decision-making. From privatization in corrections we
also learn that there are dangers involved in allowing profit in-
centives to infect the decision-making processes of private
parties.
Because of the profit incentive that privatization injects into its
cleanup and redevelopment process, privatization as practiced in
the Ohio brownfields redevelopment model may go beyond a
reasonable agency delegation of responsibility. Because Ohio's
program has limited oversight and questionably effective audit
provisions, it presents dangers similar to those posed, albeit in a
manner more dangerous to human freedoms, by the use of pri-
vate prisons. With respect to environmental cleanups, the dan-
gers are to human health and the environment. Because the
program effectively grants private parties authority to make deci-
sions with respect to a landowner's rights and responsibilities, the
state abdicates important decision-making authority to unac-
countable private individuals.
Acknowledging that there are important differences in the
privatization mechanisms at work, from privatization in state mo-
tor vehicle inspection programs we learn that with sufficient clar-
ity of inspection standards, coupled with adequate state oversight
and certification standards, private parties can carry out govern-
ment tasks with efficiency. Perhaps, with increased government
involvement and oversight, such as in New York's motor vehicle
inspection programs, state brownfields programs can make good
use of the environmental expertise of private professionals. This
is done in some states where state agencies retain decision-mak-
ing authority. Perhaps there can still be some cost savings. How-
ever, to relinquish decision-making authority to parties with a
profit motive, in the absence of stringent regulatory controls, is
an abdication of state governmental responsibility.
in
OTHER INNOVATIONS IN STATE BROWNFIELDS
REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Although this Article presents in-depth discussion of only two
innovations in state brownfields programs, there certainly are
others. The two innovations addressed by this Article can have
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great positive effect on brownfields programs and the environ-
ment, although, as noted, they also present certain risks. This
Part discusses a few additional innovations in state brownfields
law, mostly to show that they exist, and that creativity in these
programs goes beyond the innovations discussed above.
Colorado's brownfields program, for example, is noteworthy
because "upon satisfactory completion of voluntary remedial ac-
tivities, Colorado is under a non-discretionary duty to actively
pursue an EPA determination that the property will not be sub-
ject to further federal enforcement action." '333 Many other state
programs have reached agreements with the applicable EPA Re-
gion to have that Region accept the state's work and promise not
to pursue the site. Few state programs, however, have agreed to
seek a determination with respect to an individual site outside
the blanket provisions of its particular agreement with the EPA
Region. This is a significant innovation in law because it requires
the state agency to stand by and advocate for the quality of its
work. On April 11, 1996, the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment, together with three other states, signed
an agreement with the EPA solidifying this unique statutory pro-
vision.3 34 "[I]f the health department has approved a cleanup
plan, [the U.S.] EPA will permit the cleanup to proceed under
state direction. The federal agency ... [will] not take any future
legal action against any new owners of sites as long as cleanups
are completed as planned and the use of the property remains
the same. 3 3
5
Connecticut has a creative program in place called the Urban
Sites Remediation Program in which the state takes ownership of
a brownfield site and becomes the party responsible for cleaning
it up.3 3 6 Once the state finds a private party to reuse the prop-
erty, the state Department of Economic Development buys the
land and assumes responsibility. "The State recaptures at least
some of its clean-up costs under the resale agreement. ' 337 How-
ever, while the program is novel, some argue that these cleanups
333 See CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-16-307(2)(a)(I).
334 State Signs Brownfield Agreement with EPA, DAILY ENV'T. REPORT, Apr. 30,
1996, at D28.
335 Id.
336 See Tondro, supra note 257, at 810.
337 Tondro, supra note 257, at 810.
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and purchases "will never be substantial enough to significantly
reduce the number of Brownfields" in the state.338
Like many other states, Massachusetts offers volunteer
remediators a Covenant Not To Sue. However, in Massachu-
setts, the Covenant becomes effective before the remediation has
begun. The Covenant is available only to persons not considered
"potentially responsible parties" (PRPs) and to those who volun-
teer to clean up the site. The Covenant's scope is broad as it
protects owners and lenders against liability even for contamina-
tion discovered after the Covenant was signed.339 Furthermore,
protection extends even if "the established safe level for a con-
taminant is reduced so that what was considered a safe level at
the time the clean-up occurred is subsequently no longer consid-
ered to be safe."' 34 0 Not surprisingly however, Massachusetts im-
poses "Activity and Use Limitations," a form of restrictive
covenant, on properties cleaned to less stringent standards.34'
Under Indiana's Voluntary Cleanup Program, volunteer
remediators submit investigation and voluntary remediation
work plans to the state for review and approval.342 Prior to sub-
mitting work plans to the state for review and approval, volun-
teers must enter into a "voluntary remediation agreement ...
[which] sets the terms and conditions for the evaluation and im-
plementation of the work plan. '343 The agreement must contain
a dispute resolution mechanism such as arbitration or adjudica-
tion.344 Finally, the work plan is subject to a public hearing and
comment.345 When the volunteer completes the cleanup accord-
ing to the work plan, the state issues a "Certificate of Comple-
338 Tondro, supra note 257, at 811.
339 John F. Shea, Hazardous Waste Cleanup Law, MASSACHUSETTS ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW, MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, 464 PLI (Real) 135,
227 (1999).
340 Tondro, supra note 257, at 809.
341 Tondro, supra note 257, at 799.
342 See Sweeney, supra note 204, at 142 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-9
(West 1994)).
34 3 See Sweeney, supra note 204, at 143 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-
13(a)(West 1994)).
344 See Sweeney, supra note 204, at 143 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-
13(a)(2) (West 1994)).
34S See Sweeney, supra note 204, at 143-44.
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tion." '3 4 6 The Certificate of Completion is "a condition precedent
to the issuance of a Covenant Not to Sue. 3
4 7
Notably, the Indiana program does not contain a statutory pro-
tection for lenders. Additionally, the Covenant Not to Sue "ex-
tends neither to future liability for property previously
remediated under a voluntary work plan, nor to contamination
not known at the time the Certificate of Completion was
issued."348
The Pennsylvania program contains a system of variable stan-
dards, similar to many other states. However, Pennsylvania goes
beyond what other states allow in terms of the consequences of
selecting a cleanup standard.349 In some states' voluntary pro-
grams, volunteers can choose among various types of standards:
background standards, generic numeric standards, or site-spe-
cific, risk-based standards tied to the intended future use of the
land. In those states, if a remediator chooses a site-specific
cleanup standard the remediator does not receive a release from
liability for future cleanup that would be necessary for a higher
use of the land.35° Other states separate the issue of Covenants
Not To Sue and releases from liability from determinations re-
garding cleanup standards.35' Pennsylvania, on the other hand,
releases owners from liability for cleanups for restricted use re-
gardless whether there is an actual proposal for reuse for a re-
stricted purpose.352 Pennsylvania also makes restricted cleanups
available for undeveloped lands.353
Critics of Pennsylvania's program fear that it will lead to devel-
opment of contaminated land that was not already developed,
frustrating the urban renewal purpose of the law.3 54 They also
fear it will render large tracts of land unusable in the future for
higher uses such as housing.355
346 Sweeney, supra note 204, at 144 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8, 9-17 (West
1994)).
347 See Sweeney, supra note 204, at 143.
348 See Sweeney, supra note 204, at 144-45.
349 See Denworth, supra note 18, at 30.
350 This is true, for example, in Texas and Massachusetts. See Denworth, supra
note 18, at 30.
351 This is true with respect to Michigan's program. See Denworth, supra note 18,
at 30.
352 See Denworth, supra note 18, at 30.
353 See Denworth, supra note 18, at 30.
354 See Denworth, supra note 18, at 30.
355 See Denworth, supra note 18, at 30.
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Thus, states are using legislative innovation to encourage
brownfields redevelopment by reducing the environmental barri-
ers to liability. They are using private professionals to carry out
portions of the state's job, and tying cleanup standards to the
intended future use of the land. States are also using many crea-
tive variations of these ideas in their efforts to encourage
redevelopment.3 5 6
CONCLUSION
Although state legislators and administrators have been inno-
vative in their use of law and administrative rules to encourage
the cleanup and reuse of contaminated urban land, state
brownfields programs have not been as effective as many hoped
they would be. Innovations in brownfields redevelopment pro-
grams include, among others, the use of cleanup standards deter-
mined according to the intended future use of the land, and the
use of private parties, not only to carry out investigation and
cleanup at brownfields sites, but more importantly, to certify the
cleanup for liability protection from the state. The first innova-
tive approach presents some difficulties, primarily because the
use of risk-based standards mandates the use of institutional con-
trols that cannot provide eternal control of land use. Only with
adequate, predictable, control of future land uses can risk-based
standards provide sufficient protection against human exposure
to contaminants that remain on brownfields land. Also, risk-
based cleanup standards leave a trail of externalized costs. Spe-
cifically, they impose costs on groundwater resources, future gen-
erations of landowners and land users, and neighboring
landowners and land users. Despite these costs and dangers,
356 Brownfields redevelopment, formerly a site-specific problem, has newly been
viewed as an area-wide problem. Scholars have suggested that area-wide planning
would better serve the cause of redevelopment, but that a statutory or administra-
tive framework is needed to achieve this. Although a few states, such as Michigan
and Florida, have begun to plan on an area-wide basis, others are beginning to fol-
low suit. Area-wide planning would (1) create a process for defining and delineating
areas affected by multiple brownfields, (2) aggregate and organize all available in-
centives for addressing the brownfields within each area, (3) solicit, develop, and
integrate input on a remediation plan for the area from owners of the brownfields
within the area, as well as from persons interested in developing the brownfields in
that area, (4) provide support, incentives, and assistance for remediation and rede-
velopment of the brownfields in the area. See D. Evan van Hook, Area-Wide
Brownfields Planning, Remediation, and Development, 11 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J.
743, 752-53 (2000).
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risk-based cleanup standards have reduced the cleanup costs as-
sociated with some sites thereby helping to encourage their
remediation, albeit partial remediation. If states can work to re-
duce the adverse effects caused by the externalized costs of risk-
based cleanups, and address the many other barriers to
brownfields redevelopment that these programs do not address,
risk-based cleanup standards can be a useful piece of a solution
to this complicated problem.
The second innovation, the increased use of private parties in
state brownfields programs, presents problems only if not cou-
pled with enhanced oversight. When the state delegates to pri-
vate parties the task of determining when a site is sufficiently
clean for the state to provide liability protection to the land-
owner, one should be concerned that the state is abdicating im-
portant authority. However, as indicated in other areas of public
service, such systems can work, and even enhance efficiency
when coupled with adequate state oversight.
As we seek to establish viable, effective, and efficient state
brownfields redevelopment programs, these innovations in law
illustrate promising approaches, but present some concerns in
their methods. Perhaps we can learn from the weaknesses
presented in other areas of government work to establish long-
term enforcement mechanisms for the institutional controls that
must accompany risk-based cleanup standards and to require ad-
equate state oversight when private professionals are involved in
the brownfields cleanup certification process.
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